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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents three chapters examining different aspects of market liquidity. The first 
chapter explores whether investor sentiment has the power to forecast stock market liquidity. 
The chapter employs the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure as a proxy for price-impact, the 
bid-ask spread as a transaction cost measure of liquidity, and the individual investor sentiment 
spread and the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index to represent investor sentiment. 
Analysing NYSE stocks from 1994 to 2015 over weekly and monthly out-of-sample forecast 
horizons, the study finds investor sentiment is a statistically significant predictor of stock 
market liquidity. The second chapter explores the so-called “presidential gap” in U.S monetary 
aggregates. By examining monthly data from 1959 to 2017, the study finds a positive and 
significant Democratic premium in the inflation adjusted growth rates of narrow money, broad 
money and the money multiplier. The Democratic premium remains statistically significant 
and economically meaningful in the M1 and M2 growth rates after controlling for 
autoregressive components and the distributed lags of the federal funds rate. Moreover, the 
chapter finds a partisan Fed chair is a statistically significant indicator to explain the 
presidential gap. Finally, the third chapter investigates the transmission of commodity prices 
to the illiquidity of 22 currencies relative to the U.S dollar. The chapter exploits a new monthly 
dataset of commodity terms of trade (CTOT) in a GVAR framework over the period between 
01/1994 and 12/2016. On the supply side, illiquidity of the currencies of less developed 
economies experience a significant and persistent fall following a local CTOT shock. On the 
demand side, the study finds a negative and persistent effect of a local CTOT shock on the 
illiquidity of most currencies, excluding highly liquid currencies. Finally, illiquidity of the 
currencies that are considerably exposed to commodity exporting and the currencies of smaller 
economies are significantly influenced by common commodity price shocks.   
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Overview 
 
Background and objectives of the study 
Liquidity is one of the fundamental building blocks of modern financial markets. It can perhaps 
be defined as easiness to execute market operations with little transaction cost, short time frame 
and minimal price impacts. As Easley and O’Hara (2004) explains, liquidity is hard to define 
but easy to feel, especially during crises.  
Market liquidity is not a unique concept for a specific market. It has implications for almost all 
segments of global financial markets. Understanding the drivers of market liquidity is of 
interest to investors, portfolio managers and policymakers. Especially in the recession period, 
market liquidity can dry up very quickly and cost financial institutions and tax payers much 
more than expected. Additionally, the theoretical models show that market liquidity can 
evaporate very quickly during a crisis through the interaction effects between lower prices and 
higher volatility as financial agents faces losses and higher margins (Brunnermeier and 
Pederson, 2009). Given the existence of leverage and moral hazard, liquidity can be insufficient 
when it is needed most (Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011). Therefore, understanding areas of 
market liquidity is of the utmost importance not just because of the interest of market players, 
but also to stabilize negative future outcomes by revealing the interactions of market liquidity.  
This thesis studies three aspects of market liquidity, namely, forecasting stock market liquidity, 
exploring the US monetary aggregates under different political regimes and the transmission 
of commodity price to FX liquidity. 
Examining the stock market, I investigate whether investor sentiment has a statistical power to 
forecast market liquidity. Investor sentiment is linked with market liquidity by direct volume 
channels (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Baker and Stein, 2004) as well 
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as indirect behavioural channels (DeLong et al., 1990; Liu, 2015; Kahneman and Riepe, 1998; 
Gervais and Odean, 2001). However, none of these papers attempts to assess whether investor 
sentiment can forecast stock market liquidity. On the other hand, the existing studies in 
liquidity forecasting are bounded by either short-term quote predictability (Hardle, Hautsch 
and Mihoci, 2012) or focus on modelling liquidity risk (Weiß and Supper, 2013) rather than 
liquidity itself. NYSE liquidity is characterized by employing transaction cost, price-impact 
measures, and investor sentiment using sentiment spread from the American Association of 
Individual Investor and the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index. By examining more 
than 2000 NYSE stocks from 1994 to 2016 in a weekly and monthly out-of-sample forecasting 
framework, I show that investor sentiment can be a useful indicator to forecast the NYSE 
liquidity 1-4 steps ahead in the weekly and 1-2 steps ahead in the monthly estimations.  
From the aspect of monetary liquidity, I investigate U.S. monetary aggregates within different 
political regimes in the second chapter. Previous studies document a striking phenomenon in 
U.S. political-economy cycles. The U.S. economy (Blinder and Watson, 2016) and stock 
markets (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003; Pastor and Veronesi, 2017) perform significantly 
better under Democrat presidencies than Republican presidencies. Despite several attempts 
(Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003; Pastor and Veronesi, 2017; Blinder and Watson, 2016; Sy 
and Zaman, 2011) to provide explanations of this partisan gap, the phenomenon is still 
considered as a puzzle. Given the importance of monetary aggregates to the economy and stock 
markets (Thorbecke, 1997; Chen, 2007), it is surprising that no previous studies consider U.S. 
monetary aggregates under different political regimes. As the “partisan” model of political 
business cycles supports the idea that real output may become significantly different under the 
Democrat and the Republican presidencies, the chapter expects that the money base, M1 and 
money multiplier may also be in line with the partisan cycles. After defining the main monthly 
U.S. monetary aggregates from 1959 to 2017, I carry out the diagnostic tests, adjusting the data 
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from inflation, trends, unit roots and seasonality. I find that the partisan gap in narrow and 
broad money indicators is even more pronounced than GDP growth and stock market 
performance, while it is less noticeable in the case of the money multiplier. The Democratic 
premium is found to be 5.15 percent and 9.12 percent for M1 and M2 growth rates, respectively. 
The Democratic premium remains statistically significant and economically meaningful in M1 
and M2 growth rates after controlling for the autoregressive components and the distributed 
lags of the federal funds rate. Moreover, the chapter finds a partisan FED chair is a statistically 
significant indicator to explain the presidential gap. In other words, the democratic Fed chair 
gap is found to be more robust than the democratic presidential gap in the growth rates of the 
monetary aggregates.  
In the final research chapter, examining foreign exchange (FX) market, I investigate the 
transmission of commodity price movements to the illiquidity of 22 currency pairs relative to 
the U.S dollar.  The foreign exchange market is considered to be highly liquid. As of 2016 data, 
the average daily market turnover was $5.1 trillion per day (BIS, 2016). In recent years, FX 
liquidity has received increasing attention. Several studies (Banti et al., 2012; Banti and 
Phylaktis, 2015; Karnaukh, Ronaldo and Soderlind, 2015; Mancini et al., 2013; Menkhoff et 
al., 2012) explore the drivers of FX liquidity and find the TED spread, volatility as the main 
commonality and local money market and capital flows as the main cross-sectional 
determinants. However, none of these studies considers commodity prices as a determinant of 
FX liquidity. The linkages between commodity prices and international finance have received 
more attention in the exchange rate literature. The concept of “commodity currencies” indicates 
that commodity price is an important driver of the exchange rate movements under the sticky-
price model of an open economy with non-traded goods, a portfolio balance model and the 
terms-of trade hypothesis (Chen and Rogoff, 2003; Chen, 2004). From other way around, 
similar findings document that exchange rates also influence or Granger-cause commodity 
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prices as they are determined by the net present value of fundamental asset prices (Zhang et 
al., 2016; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996; Engel and West, 2005; Chen at al., 2010; Alquist et al., 
2012). Finally, some studies (Ferraro et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2010; Zhang, et al., 2016) 
document that commodity prices have the power to forecast exchange rates or the other way 
around, particularly in the case of “commodity currencies”. Commodity prices may influence 
FX liquidity from different channels. From the demand side perspective, commodities are a 
vital part of international trade flows, hence can be a determinant of FX liquidity. Since 
commodity prices are one of the factors that link exchange rates and economies each other, it 
would be a potential driver of FX liquidity from the commonality perspective. Finally, as 
commodity prices may significantly influence the local funding conditions especially in 
economies which are significantly exposed to exporting commodities, they affect FX liquidity 
from the supply side perspective. Considering the above channels that commodity prices may 
transmit to FX liquidity, it is clearly worthwhile exploring whether commodity prices are a 
determinant of FX liquidity.   
To better estimate local effects of commodity prices shocks, I assemble a new, monthly dataset 
for commodity terms of trade. The existing dataset has been improved by preparing it at a 
higher (monthly) frequency, updating trading weights every year in countries’ trade 
composition and extending the data to the end of 2016.  By estimating, the transmission of 
commodity prices to FX liquidity in a rich, GVAR framework, I find that local CTOT shocks 
have a negative and persistent effect on illiquidity of the currencies of less developed 
economies in the supply side estimation, all of the currencies excluding highly liquid and some 
Asian currencies in the demand side estimation, of the commodity and less developed 
currencies in the estimation expressing commodity prices as commonality factor.  
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Contributions of the thesis  
The thesis can be beneficial to researchers, investors and policymakers. The thesis contributes 
to the literature in three areas of market liquidity from several aspects. It provides major 
contributions to the liquidity forecasting, money supply and FX liquidity literature, and other 
contributions and suggestions relate to the market microstructure, behavioural finance, U.S 
presidential gap, commodity prices and GVAR areas. The contributions to the literature can be 
structured as follows. 
The thesis contributes to the market microstructure literature in the first chapter. By analysing 
more than 2000 stocks on the NYSE over more than two decades, the thesis provides new 
empirical work to forecast stock market liquidity by using investor sentiment indicators. It finds 
that investor sentiment is a useful indicator to forecast the transaction cost and price-impact 
measures of stock market liquidity in the weekly and monthly out-of-sample forecast 
framework. The chapter also contributes to the scarce literature on liquidity forecasting. 
Additionally, the chapter suggest to the behavioural finance literature that simple survey 
measures of investor sentiment might become more successful measurements than academic 
proxies such as Baker and Wurgler (2006).  
The thesis makes a significant contribution in the second chapter by exploring the US monetary 
aggregates under different political regimes from 1959 to 2017. The chapter contributes to the 
money supply, monetary policy and the U.S presidential puzzle literature by providing 
empirical evidence that there is a positive and significant Democratic premium in the inflation 
adjusted growth rates of narrow money, broad money and the money multiplier. The chapter 
emphasizes that the partisan Fed chair is a statistically significant indicator to explain the 
presidential gap and the democratic Fed chair gap seems statistically more robust than the 
democratic presidential gap in the growth rates of the monetary aggregates. By emphasising 
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these findings, the chapter suggests to the U.S. presidential puzzle literature that it might be 
more worthwhile to focus on the local scale political affiliation rather than the country wide 
presidential gap. Finally, the chapter suggests to the political theory and all relevant 
stakeholders that the role of political affiliation in deriving successful economic and financial 
outcomes is important. 
The thesis provides major contributions to international finance literature in the third chapter. 
First, it provides a new, monthly dataset for commodity terms of trade (CTOT). The chapter 
improves the current CTOT dataset by constructing at a monthly frequency, updating trade 
weights of countries’ trade composition and extending the dataset to the end of 2016. Second, 
the chapter provides rich empirical work for the transmission of commodity prices to FX 
liquidity. The chapter finds that commodity price shocks significantly matter to the cross-
sectional illiquidity of most floating exchange rates. Commodity prices are also found as a 
significant commonality factor of FX liquidity.  
The thesis can be useful to investors. In the first chapter, investors can benefit from the results 
by having a better vision of the future direction of stock market liquidity in a straightforward 
forecasting framework. Investors specializing in liquidity investing can also benefit from the 
results of the third paper to better model the illiquidity component of a given currency by using 
the relevant information on commodity prices.  Policymakers and investors can both benefit 
from the findings of the second chapter: (i) The democratic Fed chair gap seems statistically 
more robust than the democratic presidential gap in the growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates. (ii) It might be worthwhile to focus on the local scale political affiliation rather 
than the country wide presidential gap. (iii) The role of political affiliation in deriving 
successful economic and financial outcomes is important.  
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Structure of the thesis 
This thesis presents empirical investigations in the stock market, monetary and FX areas of 
market liquidity. The main body of the thesis is structured in the following three chapters. The 
chapters are followed by concluding remarks section that summarize the thesis, highlights the 
limitations and suggests the areas for further research. 
The first chapter is an empirical investigation that examines the power of investor sentiment to 
forecast stock market liquidity at the weekly and monthly horizons from 1994 to 2015. The 
chapter defines bid-ask spread as a transaction cost measure and Amihud (2002) as a price-
impact measure of liquidity. In the meantime, investor sentiment is defined using investor 
sentiment spread from the American Association Individual Investor and Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) sentiment index. The chapter applies all common stocks of the NYSE in a 
straightforward forecasting framework. 
The second chapter explores U.S monetary aggregates under different political regimes from 
1959 to 2017. The chapter introduces several empirical models to control the main possible 
drivers of monetary aggregates that could potentially sweep away the effects of the partisan 
gap. Additionally, the chapter explores the partisan gap in the Fed chairman and model with 
potential determinants. 
The third chapter is an empirical work that investigates the transmission of commodity prices 
to the illiquidity of 22 currencies relative to the U.S dollar. The chapter exploits a new monthly 
dataset of commodity terms of trade (CTOT) in the GVAR framework over the period between 
1994:01 and 2016:12. The study explores the transmission of commodity prices to FX liquidity 
in demand side and supply side equations of liquidity as well as in the equation expressing 
commodity prices as commonality factor.  
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Chapter 1. Does investor sentiment forecast stock 
market liquidity?  
1.1 Introduction 
 
Forecasting stock market liquidity is of interest to investors, portfolio managers and policy 
makers. Particularly in the recession period, market liquidity can evaporate very quickly and 
cost financial markets much more than anticipated. Therefore, modelling and forecasting 
liquidity is important not just because of the interest of the market players but also to stabilize 
negative future outcomes that arise from liquidity shortages in the markets.  
Nevertheless, a few natural and practical challenges remain in the existing literature that 
prevent sophisticated liquidity modelling and forecasting framework. The first challenge is the 
fact that unfortunately, market liquidity is an unobservable phenomenon as the market data 
cannot directly reveal the liquidity component. Since the first ever comprehensive attempt by 
Roll (1984) to extract the liquidity component from the data, several metrics have been 
suggested to adopt a proxy for the liquidity component. As this paper does not aim to test the 
validity of the existing measurements, we focus on comparative studies (Goyenko, Holden and 
Trzcinka, 2009) to adopt appropriate liquidity metrics. The second shortcoming is practical 
limitations of current studies. In other words, existing studies either are constrained by short 
term quote predictability (Härdle, Hautsch and Mihoci, 2012) or focusing on modelling 
liquidity risk (Weiß and Supper, 2013) rather than liquidity itself.  
Investor sentiment as a concept is considered as an important contribution in behavioural 
finance theory.  Investor sentiment, in a broad sense, can be defined as investors’ optimistic 
and pessimistic biases while investing in the financial markets (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). 
Although, several proxies are suggested to capture different aspects of investor sentiment, 
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Baker and Wurgler (2006), Baker and Wurgler (2007) develop a conceptual proxy for investor 
sentiment designed to capture possible deriving factors under an umbrella.  Investor sentiment 
is linked with market liquidity with direct volume channels (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Baker 
and Wurgler, 2007; Baker and Stein, 2004) as well as indirect behavioural channels (DeLong 
et al., 1990; Liu (2015); Kahneman and Riepe, 1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001). However, 
none of these papers attempts to assess whether investor sentiment can forecast stock market 
liquidity.  
In this study, we aim to test whether stock market liquidity can be forecasted by using investor 
sentiment indicator. In other words, the paper assesses whether investor sentiment has the 
power to forecast stock market liquidity over the weekly and monthly horizons. To maintain 
the validity of the results, we apply both transaction cost and price-impact measures of 
liquidity. Regarding investor sentiment, we utilize a survey measure as well as abovementioned 
academic proxy. 
After carrying out the cross-metrics empirical analysis in the weekly and monthly out-of-
sample forecasting framework, we find that investor sentiment as a behavioural proxy can 
become a useful indicator to forecast stock market liquidity. The forecast performance is found 
to be better in the weekly estimations with the survey-based sentiment measure rather than the 
monthly estimation with the academic proxy.  By contrast, the survey measure can forecast the 
NYSE liquidity better than the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index in monthly 
frequency, as well. 
This chapter contributes to the liquidity forecasting literature by finding a statistically 
significant predictor (i.e investor sentiment) which can successfully forecast stock market 
liquidity at the weekly and monthly frequencies. Additionally, the forecasting work does not 
require on heavy computational burden as it is merely carried out in the OLS framework. 
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Therefore, investors can benefit it and easily use publicly available investor sentiment 
indicators to have a vision on the future direction of stock market liquidity. The chapter also 
contributes to the scarce literature on the linkage between investor sentiment and market 
liquidity.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section reviews the literature on 
the theoretical link between market liquidity and investor sentiment as well as featured works 
on liquidity forecasting and well-known academic liquidity metrics. In the third section, we 
describe applied liquidity and investor sentiment indicators in detail, present the forecasting 
methodologies and the forecasting performance measurements. The fifth section outlines the 
results and the forecasting power of the model relative to the benchmark. In the last section, 
we emphasize the major findings and summarize the paper with concluding remarks. 
1.2 Literature review and theoretical underpinnings 
 
A wide range of the market liquidity measures are applied in the academic literature. For 
instance, in the context of the price-impact relationship, market liquidity has been defined as 
the inverse of the price sensitivity to order flows (Kyle, 1985). In his effective bid-ask spread 
setup, Roll (1984) defines liquidity as the negative serial dependency between successive price 
changes. In the transaction cost view, a variety of spread measures are available in market 
microstructure works. Meanwhile, investor sentiment as a conceptual framework is proposed 
by Baker and Wurgler (2006) to characterize optimism or pessimism about the future stock 
market performance. Nevertheless, some survey-based sentiment measures, of which one is 
applied here, are available designed to capture direct investor opinions.  
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1.2.1 Market liquidity and investor sentiment 
 
Investor sentiment may influence to market liquidity through three distinct channels: 
1.2.1.1 Noise trading 
In the context of illiquidity, Kyle (1985) classifies market participants into three groups: noise 
trader, the insider and market makers. As any of these traders are affected by investor 
sentiment, market liquidity will be affected as well. When noise trading is larger, the market 
makers believe that the proportion of the insider trading is lower. This belief subsequently 
induces market makers to adjust the price by a smaller amount which means the price impact 
caused the order flow is lower and liquidity increases.  
Moreover, DeLong et al. (1990) show that noise traders aggressively short sell stocks if their 
sentiment is high (bullish) or low (bearish) by means of overvaluation or undervaluation of the 
stock price. As noise traders misperceive the future market prices, higher sentiment induces 
noise trading to sell or buy aggressively. In addition, Liu (2015) emphasizes real world short 
sale constraints and claims that the noise traders can only trade when their sentiment is high. 
Consequently, the higher sentiment induces noise traders to trade more aggressively. Thus, the 
synthesized results from these two studies stimulates the conclusion that higher investor 
sentiment generates larger noise trading which in turn stimulates lower price impact of order 
flow. 
1.2.1.2 Inefficient market 
Baker and Stein (2004) differentiate market makers into rational and irrational categories. In 
this framework, rational market makers correctly infer the insider information whereas 
irrational market makers underreact to insider information as they are biased by 
overconfidence.  If the proportion of irrational market makers is higher relative to the rational 
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group, a lower price impact will be observed in the market, as the underreaction bias does not 
stimulate the correction of prices inflated by insiders.  
On the other hand, irrational market makers only exist if investor sentiment is higher and 
constantly overvalues the intrinsic value of the stock. Consequently, as investor sentiment 
induces higher irrational market makers, the market will be less efficient, the lower price 
impact will be observed which in turn stimulates more market liquidity. 
1.2.1.3 Overconfidence 
The Kahneman and Riepe (1998) research on investor psychology reveals that investment 
decision making process can be mostly affected by sentiment and overconfidence biases. From 
the psychological perspectives, optimistic investors are more likely to be overconfident which 
induces more aggressive trading, provides more market liquidity. Moreover, Gervais and 
Odean (2001) argue that past investment success generates additional overconfidence and make 
noise traders excessively bullish in the following investment cycles.  
In summary, the literature reveals investor sentiment may increase stock market liquidity 
through the channel that irrational market makers psychologically biased by overconfidence 
trade more aggressively in the inefficient markets. However, the reverse causality relationship, 
more clearly, market liquidity increasing investor sentiment might exist, although there is no 
empirical work to support it. 
1.2.2 Liquidity forecasting 
 
The liquidity forecasting literature is mostly bounded by forecasting monetary aggregates. 
Central Banks are closely interested in making strong projections on the expected amount of 
the money aggregates to make policy decisions on interest rates and financial stability. 
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However, published literature on forecasting market liquidity is limited by a few papers which 
attempted to model the dynamics of bid and ask curves.  
Weiß and Supper (2013) is one of the pronounced papers in the liquidity forecasting literature 
which attempts to model the joint distribution of bid-ask spread and log returns of a stock 
portfolio by using Autoregressive Conditional Double Poisson and GARCH processes for the 
marginals and vine copulas for the dependence structure. This paper finds evidence for strong 
co-movements in liquidity and strong tail dependence between bid-ask spreads and log returns 
from intraday data. Afterwards, they forecast three types of liquidity-adjusted intraday Value-
at-Risk measurement by incorporating commonalities in liquidity and co-movements of stocks 
and bid-ask spreads. They find from the backtesting results that the proposed models perform 
well in forecasting liquidity-adjusted intraday portfolio profits and losses.  
A few papers (for example, Härdle, Hautsch and Mihoci, 2012) attempt to model the dynamics 
of ask and bid curves in a limit order book market applying a dynamic semiparametric factor 
model. Best bid and best ask quotes are modelled with appropriate factor loading using vector 
error correction specification. By using a sample from the Australian Stock Exchange, they 
find that the model can capture the spatial and temporal dependencies of the limit order book. 
A noteworthy contribution of the paper is finding evidence for short-term quote predictability. 
Moreover, they show that recent liquidity demand has the strongest impact on the pattern of 
the variable reflecting the current state of the market.  
1.2.3 Liquidity measures 
 
Liquidity is an unobservable variable as the market data cannot explicitly reveal the liquidity 
of a security.  However, a number of liquidity measures have been suggested in the academic 
literature to capture different aspects of liquidity. We discuss some of them which are 
considered robust relative to the benchmark spreads (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009). 
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Roll (1984) develops an effective bid-ask spread measure based on the efficient market 
hypothesis. Within the efficient market, they assume the fundamental price fluctuates randomly 
while trading cost negative serial dependency in successive market price changes. Let denote 
𝑉𝑡 be the unobservable fundamental value of the stock on day t. Assume that it evolves as  
                                                             𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡                                                            (1.1)                                                                                                                                               
Where 𝑒𝑡 is the mean-zero, serially uncorrelated public information shock on day t.  
Afterwards, let 𝑃𝑡 be the last observed trade price on day t. Assume it is determined by 
                                                             𝑃𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡 +
1
2
𝑆𝑄𝑡                                                           (1.2) 
Where S is the effective spread and 𝑄𝑡 is a buy/sell indicator for the last trade that equals +1 
for a buy and -1 for a sell. Assume that 𝑄𝑡 is equally likely to be +1 or -1, is serially uncorrelated 
and is independent of 𝑒𝑡. Taking the first difference in the equation (1.2) and combining it with 
equation (1.1) yields  
                                                               ∆𝑃𝑡 =
1
2
𝑆∆𝑄𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                                                  (1.3) 
where Δ is the change operator. Roll (1984) shows that the serial covariance is  
                                                              𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡, 𝛥𝑃𝑡−1) =
1
4
𝑆2                                           (1.4) 
Or equivalently 
                                                        𝑆 = 2√−𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡, ∆𝑃𝑡−1)                                             (1.5) 
Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) develop a liquidity measure called LOT which is an 
estimator of the effective spread based on the assumption of informed trading on non-zero-
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return days and the absence of informed trading on zero-return days. The LOT model assumes 
that the unobserved “true return” 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗  of a stock j on day t is given by  
                                                                𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝐽𝑡                                                  (1.6) 
Where 𝛽𝑗is the sensitivity of stock j to the market is return 𝑅𝑚𝑡 on day t and 𝜀𝐽𝑡 is a public 
information shock on day t. It is assumed that 𝜀𝐽𝑡 is normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance 𝜎𝑗
2. Let 𝛼1𝑗 ≤ 0 be the percent transaction cost of selling stock j and 𝛼2𝑗 ≥ 0 be the 
percent cost of buying stock j. The observed return 𝑅𝑗𝑡 on stock j given by  
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ − 𝛼1𝑗 when 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗  < 𝛼1𝑗  
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗  when 𝛼1𝑗 < 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ < 𝛼2𝑗  
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ − 𝛼2𝑗 when 𝛼2𝑗 < 𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗  
The LOT measure is found by getting the difference between the percent buying cost and the 
percent selling cost: 
                                                            𝐿𝑂𝑇 = 𝛼𝑗2 − 𝛼𝑗1                                                       (1.7) 
Another well-known and extensively used liquidity measure is a price-impact indicator 
developed by Amihud (2002). The author assumes it captures the daily response associated 
with one dollar of trading volume. In this paper, it is one of two liquidity measures we used to 
forecast. The equations and the formulas are discussed in the third section. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) develop a gamma which is considered another robust price-
impact measure (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009). They get a gamma by running the 
following regression: 
                                                 𝑟𝑡+1
𝑒 = 𝜃 + 𝜑𝑟𝑡 + (𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎)𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑟𝑡
𝑒)(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡       (1.8) 
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Where 𝑟𝑡
𝑒 is the stock’s excess return above the CRSP value-weighted market return on day t 
and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 is the dollar volume of on day t. Gamma should have a negative sign (Goyenko, 
Holden and Trzcinka, 2009) as it measures the reverse of the previous day’s order flow shock.  
Thus, the larger the absolute value of the Gamma, the larger price impact that will be observed. 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
 
In this paper, we utilize two different liquidity and investor sentiment measures to capture size 
and cost dimensions across the weekly and monthly analysis to match the frequency of the 
investor sentiment data.  
1.3.1 Liquidity measures 
 
Our data set for the liquidity measures encompasses all common stocks on the NYSE. The 
reason for choosing NYSE rather than NASDAQ, as emphasized in Amihud (2002), is the 
differences of microstructure between the NASDAQ and the NYSE stock returns. Another 
distinguishing feature of the markets is the reported volume figures. Trading is done via market 
makers in the NASDAQ operations which cause the artificial high volumes in the data whereas 
NYSE is operated by directly seller-buyer principle.  The daily data covering the period 
between 01/1994 and 12/2015 has been collected from CRSP. The main reason for the chosen 
period is to follow the findings in the literature that the stock market has become relatively 
more liquid in last two decades.   
On average year, around 2000 stocks were traded during the period studied. However, not all 
stocks are traded every day. To clean the data, we follow Chordia et al. (2000). Firstly, to avoid 
any influence of the minimum tick size, we delete a stock on a day its average price falls below 
$2. Chordia et al. (2000) include all the stocks traded at least once in ten trading days. However, 
since our analysis covers a bigger data set and following Amihud (2002), we impose more 
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stringent requirements, at least 200 out of 252, for the trading days of stocks to make sure that 
the empirical analysis represents the market characteristics as much as possible. After cleaning, 
we still have more than 1900 stocks of the NYSE in the data set.  
The first liquidity measure used in this paper is the well-known price-impact measure proposed 
by Amihud (2002). This metric is considered an illiquidity measure that originates from the 
idea in Kyle (1985) that the price responses to order flows. Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka 
(2009) demonstrate that the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is highly correlated with TAQ-
based price impact measures. The measure is obtained as the absolute price change per dollar 
of daily trading volume for each stock each day. If we denote 𝜆 as the Amihud measure, then 
the metric is computed as follows: 
                                                         𝜆𝑡𝑑
𝑖 =
|𝑅𝑡𝑑
𝑖 |
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑑
𝑖                                                                          (1.9) 
Where 𝑅𝑡𝑑
𝑖  is stock 𝑖’s return on day 𝑑 of week 𝑡 and $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑑
𝑖  is the same day dollar trading 
volume (measured in millions of dollars) of this stock. The weekly and monthly illiquidity 
measures for each stock are computed by averaging the daily measures within each week and 
month, respectively. 
                                                         𝜆𝑡
𝑖𝐴 =
1
𝐷𝑡
𝑖 ∑
|𝑅𝑡𝑑
𝑖 |
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑑
𝑖
𝐷𝑡
𝑖
𝑑=1                                                         (1.10) 
Where 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 is the number of days in the week/month t for which data are available for the stock 
𝑖. It aggregates the daily measures over weekly and monthly. The market illiquidity is 
subsequently calculated as the cross-sectional equal-weighted average of the individual stock 
illiquidity in that week/month. To adjust the inflation effect on the dollar volume of trading, 
we scale the market illiquidity by Consumer Price Index. We also take the logarithmic 
transformation of market illiquidity following Amihud (2002). 
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TABLE 1. 1 SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE LIQUIDITY AND INVESTOR SENTIMENT MEASURES 
Measure Horizon Mean Median Std 
Dev 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Amihud 
(2002) 
Weekly -7.17 -7.01 1.12 -13.54 -4.27 -1.28 3.14 
Monthly -6.79 -6.84 0.57 -8.08 -4.18 1.03 3.36 
Bid-Ask 
spread 
Weekly  -3.64 -3.63 0.09 -3.93 -1.69 9.47 18.4 
Monthly -3.64 -3.64 0.07 -3.81 -3.21 0.69 4.88 
Sentiment 
Survey 
Weekly 0.11 0.11 0.18 -0.51 0.63 0.05 -0.05 
Baker and 
Wurgler 
(2006) 
Monthly 0.15 0.02 -0.91 2.49 0.56 1.79 3.92 
 
The first two rows of Table 1.1 present the descriptive statistics of the log transformation of 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure across the weekly and monthly horizons during 1994 
and 2015. The table reveals that the weekly and monthly data share similar patterns for all 
metrics but skewness which is negatively biased in the weekly data whereas being positively 
skewed in the monthly frequency. 
FIGURE 1. 1 LOG TRANSFORMATION OF AMIHUD (2002) ILLIQUIDITY 
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Figure 1.1 presents the time series pattern of the monthly averages of the weekly logarithmic 
transformation of the market illiquidity from 1994 to 2015. Although the extreme spikes 
associated with more liquid market can only be explained by their outlier nature, the general 
pattern of the graph is in line with major historically important, financial events. For instance, 
9/11 terror event, recent financial crisis is associated with high illiquidity. We also conduct 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to check the stationarity. We allow at least 12 lags for 
performing ADF tests. 
Table 1. 2 ADF test for the liquidity and investor sentiment measures 
Measure Horizon H0: unit root P value 
Amihud (2002) Weekly raw data Rejected 0.001 
Monthly raw data Failed to reject 0.3756 
Monthly filtered  Rejected 0.000 
Bid-Ask spreads Weekly raw data Failed to reject 0.2134 
Weekly filtered Reject 0.0000 
Monthly raw data Failed to reject 0.3781 
Monthly filtered Reject 0.0000 
Sentiment Survey Weekly, Monthly Rejected 0.001 
Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) 
Monthly Rejected 0.001 
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We find that for the weekly data, the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected in favour of 
stationary with and without drift for any chosen lags. However, the stationarity condition for 
the monthly data above is violated after 9th lags which might be explained by the data 
aggregation carried out by averaging 5 daily data for the weekly figures, subsequently 
computing the averages of 4 weekly data for the monthly series. 
Therefore, we perform diagnostic checks of monthly data, find the appropriate polynomials 
and filter the data. Afterwards, we get the following graph which is stationary and free of any 
trend and seasonal components. 
Figure 1. 2  Adjusted monthly Amihud (2002) measure  
 
The second liquidity measure is the traditional bid-ask spread calculated as the difference 
between the closing values of the bid and ask prices divided by mid-price for scaling and 
comparability across the stocks.  
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                                                          𝑆𝑡𝑑
𝑖 =
𝑃𝑡𝑑
𝐴𝑠𝑘−𝑃𝑡𝑑
𝐵𝑖𝑑
𝑃𝑡𝑑
𝑀𝑖𝑑                                                             (1.11) 
The bid-ask spread is also computed across the weekly and monthly horizons.  
The second two rows of Table 1.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the log transformation of 
the bid-ask spread across the weekly and monthly horizons from 1994 to 2015. The table 
suggests that weekly data is fatter tailed and more positively skewed than the monthly averages 
which might be explained by noisier nature of higher frequency data.   
FIGURE 1. 3 LOG OF MONTHLY BID-ASK SPREADS  
 
Figure 1.3 demonstrates the time series pattern of the monthly averages of the weekly 
logarithmic transformation of the market illiquidity from 1994 to 2015. The diagnostic checks 
reveal that the monthly data above contain trends and cyclical components after 9th lags. We 
conduct Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for the weekly and monthly bid-ask spread series 
to check the stationarity.  
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We find that the weekly bid-ask spread does not contain unit root in the Autoregressive Model 
with Drift whereas found as non-stationary in the pure Autoregressive framework. Therefore, 
we find the first difference which is stationary in any selected models. Regarding the monthly 
data, we get appropriate polynomial by applying 10th, 11th, 12th lap operators simultaneously 
and subsequently filtering from the original data. Afterwards, we get the graph in the Figure 
1.4 which is stationary in any selected models and free of trends, seasonal components. 
FIGURE 1. 4  ADJUSTED MONTHLY BID-ASK SPREADS 
 
It is worth to discuss the possible correlation between two liquidity measures. Although, 
Amihud (2002) and bid-ask spread measure two different types of liquidity, it makes sense 
thinking about their possible co-direction as they are originated from the same market 
movement. We find them positively correlated indeed. The correlation coefficient is found to 
be 0.4. Consequently, we can argue that although, Amihud (2002) and Bid-Ask Spread measure 
two distinct liquidity definitions, their movements have been found to be in the same direction, 
possibly due to the fact that they measure the same underlying concept. 
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1.3.2 Investor sentiment 
 
We apply two investor sentiment proxies across the weekly and monthly horizons. 
The first metric is a survey measure which is supposed to reflect the investors’ expectations on 
the future performance of the stock market. Following Liu (2015), we calculated the difference 
between the percentages of the investors’ bullish and bearish sentiments reported by American 
Association of Individual Investors (AAII) to adopt an investor sentiment proxy. AAII 
conducts weekly survey by polling random samples of its members and ask participants their 
expectation on the market direction of up, down or the same. Afterwards, the responses are 
labelled as bullish, bearish or neutral, respectively. The data set is adjusted to the time frame 
of liquidity measures which are available from 1994 and 2015. 
FIGURE 1. 5  INVESTOR SENTIMENT SPREAD 
 
The graph suggests that the general pattern of the sentiment data is in line with the global 
financial cycles. The lowest sentiment spreads are observed around the peak of dotcom and 
credit crisis while the highest spreads are found just before the bursts of the bubbles.  
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The third raw of table 1.1 demonstrates the descriptive statistics of the individual sentiment 
spreads across the given period. The results reveal that overall distribution of the data is close 
to the normality, although the sentiment spreads can be thought positively biased as the highest 
spreads can be found more than 60% whereas the lowest spreads are never found below -60%. 
This fact confirms the overconfidence theory and the noise trading behaviour. The equality of 
the mean and the median confirms that the data does not contain too many outliers.  
We also conduct ADF tests to check the stationarity and find that the data does not contain unit 
root in the 1 percent significance level. The second sentiment metric is considered an academic 
measure proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Baker and Wurgler (2007) which is a 
more comprehensive version of the closed end fund discount paradigm. They form a composite 
index that captures the common sentiment component in the six proxies. They define 
SENTIMENT as the first principal component of the correlation matrix of six variables and 
rescaling the coefficients so that the index has unit variance.  
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = −0.241𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 0.242𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 + 0.253𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.257𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡−1 +
0.112𝑆𝑡 − 0.283𝑃𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷                                                                                                         (1.12) 
Where CEFD is the closed-end fund discount is the average difference between the net asset 
values (NAV) of closed-end stock fund shares and their market prices. It was traditionally 
supposed to be an investor sentiment indicator and was used to forecast reversion in Dow Jones 
stocks. TURN is the NYSE share turnover is based on the ratio of reported share volume to 
average shares listed from the NYSE Fact Book. They define TURN as the natural log of the 
raw turnover ratio, detrended by 5 year moving average. NIPO and RIPO are considered as the 
number and the average first day returns on the IPO market, respectively. S shows the share of 
equity issues in total equity and debt issues as high values of the equity share predict low market 
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return (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Last sentiment proxy is dividend computed as the log 
difference of the average market-to-book ratios of payers and non-payers.  
FIGURE 1. 6 INVESTOR SENTIMENT INDEX 
 
The data covers the period between 01/1994 and 09/2015 collected from Wurgler’s website1. 
The graph shows that the composite sentiment index is in line with global financial cycles. The 
data reveals that the sentiment is the highest just before dotcom bubble, found as the lowest in 
the peak of the dotcom bubble, the credit crisis of 2008-2009. 
The last row of table 1.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the sentiment index during 
01/1994 and 09/2015. Unlike the previous sentiment data, the index contains excess kurtosis 
and positively skewed. However, as in the survey data, the index is observed as the positively 
biased since the number of extreme bullish points are higher than the extreme bearish points. 
We also conduct ADF test to test stationarity of the data and find that the null hypothesis of 
series contain unit root is significantly rejected.  
                                                             
1 http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/  
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1.3.3 Forecasting 
 
We employ unconditional out-of-sample forecasting for 1, 2, 3, 4 steps ahead for the weekly 
analysis, 1, 2 steps ahead for the monthly analysis. To get an unconditional, h step ahead 
forecast from a regression model, we should get the following regression equation:  
                                                𝑦𝑇+ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                           (1.13) 
Where the dependent variables in our case are liquidity measures, 𝜆𝑡𝑑
𝑖  and 𝑆𝑡𝑑
𝑖  , and the 
respective investor sentiment indicators are considered as the independent variables.  
The in-sample estimations are carried out in the rolling window, as investor sentiment data is 
quickly digested in financial markets, including liquidity. Therefore, constantly allowing data 
older data within recursive estimations may introduce “ghost effect” to the liquidity data. The 
sample is chosen by using one third of total data for the weekly estimation, half of the data for 
the monthly estimations. The first reason is the more data points in weekly data than monthly 
data. The second is in line “ghost effect” argument that to eliminate unnecessary effects of 
older data in quickly updated data environment.  
The forecast accuracy is measured by Root Mean Squared Forecasting Error (RMSFE) which 
is calculated as: 
                                                  𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐹𝐸 = √
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑒𝑡+ℎ,𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=1                                                     (1.14) 
where  
                                                  𝑒𝑡+ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡+ℎ − 𝑦𝑡+ℎ̂                                                           (1.15) 
𝑦𝑡+ℎ   shows the actual value of the logarithmic transformation of the market illiquidity while 
𝑦𝑡+ℎ̂ indicates h period ahead forecasts. 
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The relative forecasting strength of the model for h period is measured based on the relative 
RMSFE using Random Walk without drift as the baseline model: 
                                                 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐹𝐸ℎ
𝑅𝐸𝐿 =
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑚,ℎ
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑏,ℎ
                                                        (1.16) 
where b denotes the baseline model. The model with more forecasting power than the baseline 
model should satisfy 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐹𝐸ℎ
𝑅𝐸𝐿 less than 1.  
We also apply Diebold and Mariano (1995) test to check the significance of the forecasting 
accuracy. The test statistic defines loss between the two forecasts by  
                                                𝑑𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑒1𝑡) − 𝑔(𝑒2𝑡)                                                            (1.17) 
where 𝑔(𝑒𝑖𝑡) are the squared errors of the forecasting models: 
                                                𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖?̂? − 𝑦𝑡,   𝑖 = 1,2                                                         (1.18) 
The test statistic is based on the null hypothesis that 
𝐻0: 𝐸(𝑑𝑡) = 0        ∀𝑡 
versus the alternative hypothesis 
𝐻1: 𝐸(𝑑𝑡) ≠ 0 
The null hypothesis is that the two forecasts have the same accuracy. The alternative hypothesis 
is that the two forecasts have different level of accuracy.  
We also consider alternative forecasting comparison methods. As we do not have an empirical 
evidence for the structural break in the estimations, Clark and McCracken (2005) is not 
appropriate for the forecasting comparison. Additionally, due to the forecasting works based 
on a single, a rolling, non-nested model, Clark and West (2007), Hansen (2005), Clark and 
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McCracken (2009) are not suitable, as well. Finally, Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008) show that 
Clark and West (2006) does not always test for minimum mean square forecast error.  
Thus, we apply log predictive as a third, alternative forecasting accuracy method. The metric 
compares the equality of probabilistic forecasts by giving a numerical value for the whole 
predictive distribution. The formula is based on the joint predictive density function of 
𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+2, … . , 𝑦𝑇+ℎ can be expressed as follows: 
                                     𝑆(ℎ, 𝑚) = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝(𝑦𝑡+1, … , 𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝑌𝑡
𝑇+𝑁ℎ−1
𝑡=𝑇 , 𝑚)                                    (1.19) 
We report the difference the log score of the model 𝑚  and the selected benchmark model. The 
model is considered as superior to the benchmark model if the difference in the log scores is 
positive which implies that the model m outperforms the benchmark model in term of 
predictive density accuracy.  
1.4 Empirical results 
 
We conduct the weekly and monthly analysis based on two liquidity and sentiment indicators. 
We conduct estimations after filtering seasonality and trends from the liquidity data. Two 
liquidity measures aim to capture price-impact and transactions cost aspects of market liquidity. 
In the main estimations, we apply the sentiment survey for the weekly estimations while Baker 
and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index is used for the monthly forecasts. Afterwards, we 
introduce monthly estimations with sentiment survey spread, as well. 
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TABLE 1. 3 WEEKLY OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECAST WITH AMIHUD (2002) AND SENTIMENT SPREAD  
Metrics h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 
RMSFE 0.7215 0.7340 0.7456 0.7781 
Log Score 0.9234 0.6723 0.7844 0.3756 
DM test (***) (***) (***) (***) 
Notes: Amihud (2002) and Sentiment Survey Spread are used as the liquidity and the investor sentiment indicators, 
respectively. The dependent variable (the illiquidity measure) is used as the log transformation of Amihud (2002) 
measure. The stars, *, **, *** indicate the significance of Diebold and Mariano (1995) test in the 10%,5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively.  
Table 1.3 suggests that the investor sentiment survey spread is a powerful indicator to forecast 
the NYSE stocks’ illiquidity 1, 2,3 and 4 weeks ahead. The sentiment spread obviously 
outperforms the Random Walk model in the RMSFE and log score measures. Moreover, 
Diebold and Mariano (1995) test shows that the predictive accuracy of the models is 
significantly different from each other in the 1 percent significance level. 
TABLE 1. 4 MONTHLY OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECAST WITH AMIHUD (2002) AND SENTIMENT INDEX 
Metrics h=1 h=2 
RMSFE 0.9434 0.9549 
Log score 0.4234 0.2673 
DM test (*) (*) 
Notes: Amihud (2002) illiquidity and Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index are used as the liquidity and the 
investor sentiment indicators, respectively. The dependent variable (the illiquidity measure) is used as the log 
transformation of Amihud (2002) measure. The stars *, **, *** indicate the significance of Diebold and Mariano 
(1995) test in the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Table 1.4 reports the monthly forecasting results. We here employ the academic sentiment 
proxy which is designed to capture 6 candidate proxies for the investor sentiment. Although 
the sentiment indicator is still better than random walk to forecast the price-impact measure of 
the market liquidity, it performs relatively worse than the survey indicator used for the weekly 
forecast carried out by sentiment spread.  The table shows that the sentiment index is able to 
forecast the market liquidity 1 and 2 month ahead and performs better than the benchmark 
model. The Diebold and Mariano (1995) test shows that the predictive accuracy of the models 
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is different from each other in the 10 percent significance level while less significant than the 
weekly forecast with sentiment spread.  
To test the validity of the results above, we estimate and forecast the model by applying another 
liquidity measure, well-known bid-ask spread calculated as the difference between ask price 
and bid price scaled by the mid-price for comparability. Similar to the Amihud (2002) measure, 
we get the log transformation of the spread ratio before estimating in the regression. We 
estimate the weekly analysis with the sentiment spread of the survey data and monthly analysis 
with the sentiment index. 
TABLE 1. 5 WEEKLY OUT OF SAMPLE FORECAST WITH BID-ASK SPREAD AND SENTIMENT SPREAD 
Metrics h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 
RMSFE 0.7215 0.7340 0.7456 0.7781 
Log score 0.5487 0.4912 0.2876 0.2567 
DM test (***) (***) (***) (***) 
Notes: Bid-ask Spread and the sentiment spread are used as the liquidity and the investor sentiment indicators, 
respectively. The dependent variable (the illiquidity measure) is used as the log transformation of the original bid-
ask spread ratio. The stars *,**,*** indicate the significance of the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test in the 10%,5% 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
The results reveal that the sentiment survey spread is a statistically powerful indicator to 
forecast the bid-ask spread for 1, 2, 3, 4 weeks ahead. The sentiment spread obviously 
outperforms the Random Walk model in forecasting the bid-ask spread. Additionally, Diebold 
and Mariano (1995) test confirms the significance of the difference between the predictive 
accuracy of the models.  
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TABLE 1. 6  MONTHLY OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECAST WITH BID-ASK SPREAD AND SENTIMENT INDEX 
Metrics h=1 h=2 
RMSFE 0.9434 0.9549 
Log score 0.9778 0.9907 
DM test (*) (*) 
 Notes: Bid-ask Spread and the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index are used as the liquidity and the 
investor sentiment indicators, respectively. The dependent variable (the illiquidity measure) is used as the log 
transformation of the original bid-ask spread ratio. The stars, *, **, *** indicate the significance of the Diebold 
and Mariano (1995) test in the 10%,5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
The monthly estimation results are in line with the weekly analysis, albeit being less significant. 
The Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index is also found as a successful indicator to 
forecast the spread 1 and 2 months ahead. The sentiment index forecasts the monthly spread 
better than Random Walk. The test reveals the predictive accuracy of the models is significantly 
different in 5 percent significance level.   
So far, we have carried out the monthly estimations with the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
sentiment index. For robustness check, we redo the monthly forecasts with the investor 
sentiment spread. 
TABLE 1. 7  MONTHLY OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECAST WITH AMIHUD (2002) AND SENTIMENT 
SPREAD 
 Metrics h=1 h=2 
RMSFE 0.8356 0.8423 
Log score 0.7644 0.3412 
DM test (**) (**) 
 Notes: Amihud (2002) illiquidity and the sentiment survey spread are used as the liquidity and the investor 
sentiment indicators, respectively. The dependent variable (the illiquidity measure) is used as the log 
transformation of the original spread ratio. The stars *, **, *** indicate the significance of the Diebold and 
Mariano (1995) test in the 10%,5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Table 1.7 shows that the monthly survey spread has better forecasting performance than the 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index in forecasting Amihud (2002) liquidity. It 
performed better in terms of exposing a lower relative RMSFE, positive log score and more 
significant Diebold and Mariano (1995) test results. The survey directly asks investors’ 
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opinions on the future direction of market rather than extracting sentiment from the market-
based data. This fact could be an explanation for relatively better performance of the sentiment 
survey spread over Baker and Wurgler (2006).    
TABLE 1. 8   MONTHLY OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECAST WITH BID-ASK SPREAD AND SENTIMENT 
SPREAD 
Metrics h=1 h=2 
RMSFE 0.8578 0.8876 
Log score 0.9123 0.8221 
DM test (***) (***) 
Notes: Bid-ask Spread and the sentiment survey spread are used as the liquidity and the investor sentiment 
indicators, respectively. The dependent variable (the illiquidity measure) is used as the log transformation of the 
original bid-ask spread ratio. The stars *, **, *** indicate the significance of the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test 
in the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
The same result can be found in forecasting the bid-ask spread over the monthly horizon. The 
survey spread is found to be a better and a more significant predictor than the sentiment index. 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether investor sentiment has the power to forecast stock market 
liquidity. Despite the wide range of literature on liquidity estimation and market 
microstructure, only limited numbers of papers are available in liquidity forecasting. We 
employ Amihud (2002) for a price-impact measure and bid-ask spread for a transaction cost 
indicator of liquidity. On the right hand of the equation, we adopt individual investor sentiment 
survey spread and Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index as the investor sentiment 
measurements. Our large data set of NYSE covers around 2000 stocks during 1994-2015.   
This paper is the first attempt conducting out-of-sample forecasts for stock market liquidity by 
using investor sentiment data. The weekly forecasts 1 to 4 steps ahead and the monthly 
forecasts 1 to 2 steps ahead are carried out with Diebold (2006) forecast equations while the 
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forecasts performances are measured with RMSFE, log score and Diebold and Mariano (1995) 
predictive accuracy tests. 
We conclude from the estimation results that investor sentiment is overall a significant 
indicator to forecast market liquidity. However, the sentiment survey spread is found as a better 
indicator than the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index to forecast the NYSE liquidity. 
The survey spread is found as a statistically and economically significant predictor of market 
liquidity in the weekly and monthly estimations. Likewise, Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
sentiment index is also able to forecast market liquidity better than Random Walk model, albeit 
less significantly. The results might also be explained by the frequency of analysis. Liquidity 
is better forecasted at the weekly rather than monthly frequencies. 
 Overall, regardless of being a survey measure or an academic index, the sentiment indicators 
may become powerful measurements to forecast the NYSE liquidity. However, a relatively 
higher frequency of data might be preferable to obtain a better forecast performance. 
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Chapter 2. U.S. Monetary Aggregates and Partisan 
Political Cycles   
  
     2.1 Introduction 
 
There is a striking phenomenon in U.S. political-economy cycles. The U.S. economy (Blinder 
and Watson, 2016) and stock markets (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003; Pastor and Veronesi, 
2017) perform significantly better under Democrat presidencies than Republican presidencies. 
Although, these empirical findings are strong enough to be able to argue that the U.S. economy 
favours the Democratic Party, the theoretical implications of the U.S. partisan political cycles 
are less consistent with these findings. Tax reductions, deregulation and overall right-wing 
based economic policy should produce growth and therefore favoured the Republican 
Presidencies, given they are direct signals for less government interventions in the economy. 
Despite several attempts (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003; Pastor and Veronesi, 2017; Blinder 
and Watson, 2016; Sy and Zaman, 2011) to suggest explanations for the partisan gap, the 
phenomenon is still considered as a puzzle. The partisan gap is associated with the findings 
that the observed significant return differences of stock markets, economic indicators under 
different political regimes in the U.S. that cannot be explained by rational factors. 
In this study, we explore the potential partisan gap in monetary aggregates. To our best of 
knowledge, it is the first study investigating a potential partisan gap in the monetary aggregates. 
Plenty of empirical and theoretical literature2 has suggested significant linkages between 
economic activity, especially real output, and business cycle related monetary aggregates. As 
the “partisan” model of the political business cycles supports the idea that real output may 
                                                             
2 For instance, Freeman and Kydland (2000) found positive linkages between the U.S business cycles variables 
and monetary aggregates. Beenstock (1989) expressed the similar findings between real output and money 
multiplier in the UK case. 
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become significantly different under the Democrat and the Republican presidencies, we might 
expect the money base, M1 and money multiplier may also be in line with the partisan cycles. 
Monetary aggregates can also be linked to political cycles via well-documented partisan gap in 
stock returns. The U.S partisan gap in stock returns is documented by multiple studies (Santa-
Clara and Valkanov, 2003; Sy and Zaman, 2011; Pastor and Veronesi, 2017). In the meantime, 
Thorbecke (1997) shows a positive linkage between ex-post stock returns and monetary policy. 
Furthermore, this linkage might be asymmetric as monetary policy has larger effects on stock 
returns in bear markets than bull market (Chen, 2007). Since, there is a strong evidence for the 
partisan gap in stock returns, the relationship between monetary policy and stock returns gives 
an additional stimulus to investigate the hypothesis that monetary aggregates might be also in 
line with presidential cycles. 
The partisan gap in the economy is a specific U.S. phenomenon as there is no evidence to 
support the puzzle elsewhere. Although the Conservative party positively influence the U.K. 
stock market performance, the return differences are not significantly associated with changing 
political cycles (Black et al., 2010). Similar findings are attributed to the German elections 
(Dobke and Pierdrioch, 2004). In the meantime, panel regression analysis across 15 countries 
confirms that the partisan political gap in the economy is not a global finding (Bohl and 
Gottschalk, 2006). We might explain it with the real partisan nature of the U.S. political system. 
Hence, we examine U.S. monetary aggregates to explore other evidence for the partisan 
political gap. 
Given these findings, it is a surprising fact that monetary aggregates as such important 
components of business cycles never get attention in the presidential puzzle literature. In 
particular, huge growth rates are historically observed in the U.S. monetary aggregates. 
Traditional explanations such as economic output, lagged effects might not be enough to fully 
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capture the huge growth rates of the money supply. Considering significant linkages between 
monetary aggregates and other economic indicators (stock returns, GDP growth) which are 
found to have a partisan gap, it is worthwhile to explore a similar phenomenon in monetary 
aggregates.  As a null hypothesis, the partisan gap in the growth rates of the U.S. monetary 
aggregates is statistically insignificant. In the meantime, if the growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates are significantly influenced by only its previously explored determinants (lagged 
values, monetary policy), the partisan gap should become insignificant after controlling for 
them. 
There might be concern about the aim of this study that would potentially question the concept 
of Central Bank independence. Of course, the Federal Reserve System (hereafter, Fed) 
operational independence was granted within the famous Treasury-Fed accord of 1951. 
However, historically, there have been several attempts such as Arthur Burn3’s contribution to 
the Richard Nixon re-election campaign (Abrams, 2006) and Reagan’s efforts to remove Paul 
Volcker (Silber, 2012) that could be argued to be political interventions in monetary policy. 
Moreover, given presidents have a mandate to appoint the Fed chairperson, this raises concern 
regarding the extent of institutional independence. The most recent example would be President 
Trump’s appointment of a Republican board member as Fed governor violating the general 
practice4 that Presidents usually allow the continuation of the current Fed governor to 
demonstrate the Fed’s institutional independence. The Fed, as any monetary organization, aims 
to maintain price stability by tracking the equilibrium point of output and inflation in a Taylor 
framework. As monetary organizations are mainly ex-post decision makers in the economy, 
                                                             
3 The FED chairman during 1970s 
4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/boardmembership.htm For example, William 
McChesney Martin was appointed by five different presidents, Alan Greenspan was appointed by four 
different presidents 
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Central Bank’s independence should be thought as operational independence but not 
determining the economic outlook of the country which is carried out by governments. 
Our monthly empirical estimations from 01/1959 to 09/2017 reveal that the presidential gap in 
narrow and broad money indicators are even more pronounced than GDP growth and stock 
market performance, but less notable in the case of money multiplier. The Democratic premium 
is found to be 5.15 percent and 9.12 percent for the M1 and M2 growth rates, respectively. 
However, and strikingly we did not find evidence for an economically stronger presidential 
gap after considering only first presidential terms. It might be explained by the fact that unlike 
stock markets, monetary aggregates may take more time to digest the information effect of 
changing a political party.  
Afterwards, we estimate several models to check if previously explored determinants5 of 
monetary aggregates eliminate the statistical significance of the partisan gap. We start with 
linear models by jointly estimating determinants of the U.S. monetary aggregates with the 
partisan gap as an additive dummy. From Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model, we 
find that although contemporaneous and lagged values of the growth rates of monetary 
aggregates and monetary policy (proxied by the Federal Funds rate) keep the explanatory 
powers in the variation of the monetary aggregates growth rates, the partisan gap remains 
statistically significant and economically meaningful. For the first time in the literature, we 
estimate the effect of the partisan gap in the U.S. monetary aggregates using non-linear 
estimation. The findings in the Markov switching model are found to be line with the findings 
of the linear regression analysis. High growth rates of the monetary aggregates associated with 
                                                             
5 Such as lagged growth rates of monetary aggregates, monetary policy. See for example Freeman and Kydland 
(2000) and Beenstock (1989) 
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the Democratic presidential years and low growth rates linked to the Republican presidencies 
tend to be persistent with more than 90 percent probability in their respective regimes.  
Another interesting finding occurs after controlling for the partisan gap in the lagged values of 
the growth rates of the U.S. monetary aggregates. Apparently, the presidential gap is not only 
additive to the baseline growth of the monetary aggregates but also multiplicative in the 
coefficients. Moreover, the multiplicative partisan gap induces the additive partisan gap 
become less significant. However, this finding might be due to pure econometrical reasons as 
the multiplicative and additive dummies possibly have multi-collinear relationship.  
Finally, we test the role of a partisan Fed chair to explain the presidential gap. First, we find 
that a statistically significant and economically meaningful partisan Fed chair gap is present in 
the growth rates of U.S. monetary aggregates. Second, we find that after controlling for the Fed 
chair gap, the statistical significance of the presidential gap diminishes and becomes 
insignificant. Finally, the results show that Fed chair gap in the growth rates of the US monetary 
aggregates remains statistically significant and economically meaningful even after controlling 
for autoregressive components of the growth rates and monetary policy. Consequently, we 
argue that the partisan FED cycle is a statistically more powerful than the partisan presidential 
cycles in the case of the monetary aggregates.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section reviews the literature on 
the U.S. presidential cycles from an economic perspective and also discussed related works on 
monetary liquidity. In the third section, we present the data and the main empirical models to 
be applied in the estimations. The fourth section discusses the empirical findings and the 
additional checks for robustness. In the last section, we discuss the major findings and provide 
concluding remarks. 
46 
 
2.2 Literature review and theoretical underpinnings 
 
2.2.1 The U.S. political economic cycles 
 
The early literature on the economic models of political cycles, so called “political business 
cycle” theory describes the U.S. political cycles in the “opportunistic” models where all parties 
find it optimal to adopt the same policy in order to capture the median voter (Downs, 1957). In 
addition to the assumption of the opportunistic behaviour of the parties, Nordhaus (1975) and 
MacRae (1977) contributed two more crucial assumptions and rejected the “partisan” factor.   
First, they argue that the voters have short term memories and can be systematically fooled. 
Second, the economy is described by an exploitable Philips curve6 and the rational expectations 
critique is not considered. Therefore, the opportunistic models of the “political business cycle” 
theory could not explain any differences across the Democratic and Republic administrations. 
In contrast, originating with Hibbs (1977), the literature has developed “partisan” models of 
political cycles. Hibbs (1977) shows that lower income and occupational status groups are best 
served by a relatively low unemployment-high inflation macroeconomic configuration whereas 
a comparatively high unemployment-low inflation policy package serves the interests and 
preferences of upper income and occupational status groups.  Therefore, the governments in 
the office pursue macroeconomic policies broadly in accordance with the objective economic 
interests and subjective preferences of their electoral elites and core political objectives. This 
pioneering attempt to modelling political business cycles in the context of partisan nature 
encouraged further researches to examine the structural differences between the political 
objectives in the macroeconomic policies of the main parties.  
                                                             
6 An inverse relationship between unemployment rate and wage rises 
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In particular, Alesina (1987) and Alesina and Sachs (1988) develop a partisan economic model 
in a two party repeated game. By confirming Hibbs (1977) and Hibbs (1987), they find that 
partisan politics matters when it comes to the macroeconomic policy and its outcomes in the 
business cycles. Moreover, they show that the first half of the administration indicates 
significant differences in output growth whereas the second half does not show a consistent 
statistically significant difference between the macroeconomic outputs of the economic 
policies undertaken during the political cycles. Nevertheless, the Nixon (Beck, 1984) and 
Kennedy (Alesina, 1987) governments are considered exceptions in the “partisan” theory, more 
in line with the “political business cycle” theory due to political scandals and shorter span of 
the presidential terms, respectively.  
Another striking feature of a partisan economic model originates from the differences in the 
tax policies. More left-wing governments’ (i.e Democrats) periods in office have been marked 
by higher state tax burdens whereas right wing parties (i.e Republicans) are known as typically 
being in favour of low tax or small government principles (Reed, 2006). Moreover, left-wing 
governments across the world tend to expand government revenue and expenses (Cameron, 
1978; Tavares, 2004. The US real GDP growth, during 1930 and 2015, is found to be 4.9% 
under Democratic presidencies, whereas only 1.7% during Republican presidents’ periods in 
the office. The 3.2 % difference is found to be economically and statistically significant (Pastor 
and Veronesi, 2017). 
The discussion above sheds light on the role of the US partisan gap in business cycles, 
macroeconomic policy, economic growth and the tax burden. The differences in the aspects of 
the political objectives, historical roots and more importantly, subjective preferences of the 
electoral crowd may underlie explanations for the existing partisan political economy gap.  
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Additionally, the partisan gap in the stock market returns remains a puzzle and unresolved 
despite of several attempts. In a seminal paper, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) demonstrate 
that stock markets perform significantly better under Democratic rather than Republican 
presidencies during the period 1927 and 1998. The nine percent difference for the value-
weighted portfolios and the sixteen percent difference for the equal-weighted portfolios are 
found to be statistically and economically significant. Moreover, business cycle variables, 
announcement effect, risk premium do not explain the return difference. An extended empirical 
analysis to 2015 by Pastor and Veronesi (2017) show that the evidence of partisan gap is even 
stronger. Their estimation from 1999 to 2015 reports 17.39 percent for the partisan return gap 
compared to 9.38 percent in the 1927-1998 period. A striking feature of the presidential stock 
return gap is its mean reverting characteristics. The Democratic-minus-Republic return gap is 
found the highest, 36.88 percent per year when averaged over the first year of presidency alone 
(Pastor and Veronesi, 2017). The gap gradually decreases starting from the second year when 
the difference is 15.55 percent; it is 12.43 percent over the three years. However, these values 
are still higher than full term average (10.90 percent) which might be explained by a higher 
risk premium earlier in the presidential term since there is more uncertainty on political and 
economic objectives of a new president.  
2.2.2 Monetary liquidity 
 
The definition of the monetary aggregates varies across countries and monetary organizations.  
For instance, the European Central Bank (ECB) does use M0 but adopts M1 as a narrow money 
indicator which includes physical currency in circulation as well as balances such as overnight 
deposits that can immediately be converted to cash or cash equivalents7. The ECB defines M2 
                                                             
7 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money_credit_banking/monetary_aggregates/html/hist_content.en.html  
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as “intermediate money” that includes M1 plus deposits with maturity up to 2 years and 
redeemable deposits up to 3 months. M3 is considered as a broad money measurement that 
comprises all M2 plus money market fund shares, repurchase agreements and debt securities 
up to 2 years. Note that the Bank of England8 accepts the aggregates definitions of the ECB, 
additionally defines M4 as M3 plus foreign currency deposits held by the private sector in the 
UK and sterling and foreign currency deposits held by UK public corporations with Monetary 
Financial Institutions (MFI) in the UK. 
US monetary aggregates definitions are slightly different from their European counterparts. 
Additionally, note that since 2006, the Federal Reserve System has ceased to track M3, large-
denomination time deposits, repurchase agreements and Eurodollars. Narrow money is 
defined9 as M1 which includes all physical currency outside the U.S Treasury and Federal 
Reserve, demand deposits and travellers’ checks. In the meantime, M2 is accepted as a broader 
monetary concept encompassing M1 plus saving deposits, small denomination time deposits 
and balances in retail money market funds. Finally, the money multiplier is calculated as the 
ratio of M1 to money base which is the sum of currency in circulation plus reserve deposits. In 
other words, the money multiplier demonstrates how banks can create additional money in the 
economy by per unit reserve deposits in the Federal Reserve.   
A handful of empirical macroeconomic papers have attempted to model money supply 
employing a wide range of time series models. Nelson (2002) develops a theoretical model of 
the real money base growth and the real economic activity. The empirical evidence for the UK 
and the US from 1961 to 1999 shows that the money base growth is a significant determinant 
of economic activity. As the “partisan” model of the political business cycles supports the idea 
that the economic activity may become significantly different under the Democrat and the 
                                                             
8 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/iadb/notesiadb/m3.aspx  
9 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M1SL  
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Republican presidencies, we can expect the money base may also be in line with the partisan 
cycles.  
Apart from modelling monetary aggregates separately, Kurita (2011) attempted to model the 
money multiplier by employing co-integration analysis for the Bank of Japan data. It is a 
stylised fact that the log of monetary aggregates contains stochastic 𝐼(2) trends. The paper 
shows that constructing linear combinations of logged monetary aggregates with linear 
combinations of logged prices indices can remove 𝐼(2) stochastic trends and leave the data as 
𝐼(1).  Consequently, the paper finds that the main monetary aggregates can be modelled in the 
light of the 𝐼(2) 𝑡𝑜 𝐼(1) transformation on the money multiplier.  
The endogenous nature of monetary aggregates has firstly been explored with the procyclical 
movement of the nominal money stock by Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Since then, the 
business cycle literature has attempted to model the money multiplier in the classical business 
cycle set-up (Freeman and Huffman, 1991) and to calibrate the money aggregates considering 
a long-run vision for the U.S. economy (Kydland and Prescott, 1982). In contrast to the 
monetary models, Freeman and Kydland (2000) develop a money-output model using sticky 
prices or fixed money holdings and assuming all prices and quantities are fully flexible. The 
paper finds several significant linkages between business-cycle related monetary aggregates 
and U.S. real output such as a positive correlation between M1 and real output. Additionally, 
the money multiplier and deposit-to-currency ratios are positively correlated with real output, 
whilst the price level is negatively correlated with output. Note that the correlation of M1 with 
contemporaneous prices is substantially weaker than the correlation of M1 with real output and 
these correlations among real variables are essentially unchanged under different monetary-
policy regimes and real money balances are smoother than money-demand equations would 
predict.  
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The determinants of the money multiplier have also been explored for UK monetary data. 
Beenstock (1989) investigates evolutionary of monetary policy in the United Kingdom and 
concludes that monetary aggregates were endogenously determined until the mid-1970s when 
sterling was allowed to free float. Specifically, the free float regime of the exchange rate 
allowed the money supply to become exogenous starting in the 1980s. Consequently, the 
money multiplier has become more responsive to the interest rates and economic activity. 
Although, there is no investigation for the existence of the partisan business cycles in the 
United Kingdom, the findings of the paper provide additional motivation to consider the 
possible indirect linkages between the monetary aggregates and the political regimes via 
economic activity and output.   
To sum up, monetary aggregates can be significantly different under different political regimes 
in the U.S. motivating by the economic activity and stock markets channels they are empirically 
proven to have partisan gap.  
2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
2.3.1 Data 
 
Our monthly data set covering the period between 1959:01 and 2017:09 is available from the 
of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). The official definitions of the U.S monetary 
aggregates have considerably changed over the years before our sample period. Since Federal 
mandatory reserve requirements were officially imposed in 1914, banks did not differentiate 
among demand, saving and time deposits (Anderson, 2003).  Therefore, it is not possible 
differentiate between M1 and M2 until 1914 according to the modern definitions. Likewise, 
U.S. financial institutions did not distinguish between small and large denomination time 
deposits that are necessary to split M2 from the rest of “higher order” monetary liquidity.  More 
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importantly, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System approved the monetary 
aggregates data from 01/1959, possibly due to the reasons emphasized above.  
The first monetary aggregate we employ is M1 which is officially defined10 as the sum of 1) 
currency outside the U.S. treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, the vaults of depository institutions 
2) traveller’s checks of nonbank issuers 3) demand deposits and 4) other checkable deposits.  
Figure 2.1 presents the monthly M1 aggregate for the USA from 01/1959 to 09/2017. The 
seasonally adjusted data is collected from FRED. We subsequently adjusted it for monthly 
inflation which is available from FRED as Consumer Price Index (CPI) with all items, then 
take the log value. 
FIGURE 2. 1 LOG OF THE U.S M1 INDICATOR ADJUSTED FOR SEASONALITY AND INFLATION 
  
The graph overall suggests a gradual increase in the M1 amount in real terms throughout the 
sample period. The small fluctuations and the levelling of the trends during the 1990s and 
2000s are followed by a sharper increase during the recent years. The latest trend might be 
                                                             
10 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M1SL  
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explained by the recent FED interest rate policy which remained historically low since last 
financial crises due to the fact that expansionary monetary policy increases money circulation 
in the financial system. The second monetary aggregate we use is U.S. M2 which is officially 
defined11 as the sum of all the M1 components, saving deposits, small-denomination time 
deposits and balances in retail money market mutual funds.  
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the monthly U.S. M2 aggregate from 01/1959 to 09/2017. The 
seasonally adjusted data is collected from FRED and adjusted for the monthly inflation by 
using Consumer Price Index (all items). 
FIGURE 2. 2 LOG OF THE U.S M2 INDICATOR ADJUSTED FOR SEASONALITY AND INFLATION 
 
The graph suggests a similar pattern to M1 but with a sharper increase in the M2 amount across 
the entire sample period. The difference between Figures 2.2 and 2.1 suggests a considerable 
increase in the saving and small-time deposits and the balances of money market funds after 
                                                             
11 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M2SL  
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carrying out the quantitative easing and expansionary monetary policy actions during the 
2008/2009 crisis.   
The final indicator, we employ is the U.S money multiplier computed as the ratio of M1 to the 
U.S. monetary base. The ratio literally demonstrates how banks can create additional money in 
the economy by per unit reserve deposits in the Federal Reserve.  The seasonally adjusted 
monthly data from 01/1959 to 09/2017 for the U.S. money base is collected from FRED12 , 
subsequently adjusted for inflation as in the previous aggregates. To get money multiplier, we 
find the ratio of the previously adjusted M1 to the adjusted monetary base. 
FIGURE 2. 3 LOG OF THE U.S MONEY MULTIPLIER ADJUSTED FOR SEASONALITY AND 
INFLATION 
 
On the contrary to the M1 and M2 graphs, the money multiplier in Figure 2.3 exhibits a 
downward trend throughout the observed time frame. The graph suggests that the banks created 
less money on the economy per unit of reserved deposits in the Federal Reserve year by year 
since 1959.  
                                                             
12 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AMBSL  
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FIGURE 2. 4 LOG OF THE U.S MONEY BASE ADJUSTED FOR SEASONALITY AND INFLATION 
 
Considering the fact that M1 (Figure 2.1) exhibits an upward trend throughout the period, the 
downward pattern in the U.S money multiplier might be explained by an explosively increasing 
monetary base. Figure 2.4 confirms this supposition, as the increasing trend in the money base 
amount starting 2000s years, is followed by an explosive growth since last financial crisis. On 
the other hand, the considerable increase in the monetary base might be linked to the increased 
regulatory pressure on the banks since financial crises including “Dodd-Frank”, the 
implementation the new Basel rules and so on.  
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of the underlying U.S monetary aggregates across 
the presidential cycles. In our estimation period, Republicans have more presidents with seven 
compared to the Democrats with five presidents. In general, Republicans have been in the 
office for 369 months compared to 348 months of Democrats. The new elected president 
usually starts governing the White House after the inauguration day which takes place about 
2-3 months after the election day. The U.S presidential elections usually take place in 
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November followed by the inauguration day in January. However, the certain historical events 
contributed to the breaking of this chain such as John F. Kennedy’s assassination of in 
November 1963 and Richard Nixon’s resignation in August 1974. 
Although, the political science literature (e.g Bartels, 2008; Comiskey and Marsh, 2012) 
frequently prefers to adopt one year lag or more to estimate the effect of changing political 
parties, we apply the most recent approach (Pastor and Veronesi, 2017) from the political 
economy literature which attributes the inauguration day as the beginning of each presidential 
term. The rationale behind this approach is to take the fact into account that the partisan 
political gap of the economic and financial indicators is found to be more robust in the first 
year of each presidency (Pastor and Veronesi, 2017). Nevertheless, we carry out the robustness 
checks to examine several other lagged responses.  
Continuing with Table 2.1, the monetary aggregates, in growth terms, are observed with a 
higher magnitude under the Republican presidencies (3.95% and 5.16% p.a for M1 and M2, 
respectively) than the Democrat presidencies (3.35% and 4.93% p.a for M1 and M2, 
respectively) which are associated with lower growth rate of the monetary aggregates, albeit 
almost the same standard deviations. Mr. Obama’s presidential terms are observed with 
relatively higher growth rates of the monetary aggregates. Mr. Obama’s presidential terms 
started in the peak of finacial crisis in January 2009, although he was elected in November 
2008 and heightened public expectations13 that his government was likely going to adopt an 
expansionary fiscal policy.   
Although, the Federal Reserve System started to decrease the fund rate from the end of 2007, 
the transmission was either delayed or less noticeable. Fed subsequently accompanied the 
                                                             
13 It is specifically about Obama’s government but in general, left-wing government. Nevertheless, liberal 
economists (e.g see Krugman (2009)) had higher expectations from Obama’s  government. 
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expansionary monetary policy in 2008 by decreasing the fund rate six times and reached to de-
facto zero rates14. From an econometric perspective, the lagged responses of the monetary 
aggregates to the monetary shocks absolutely make sense. Since most of the monetary shocks 
materialized under Obama’s presidency, the monetary aggregates expose high volatility. A 
complementary note that in November 2008, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee 
launched the first quantitative easing package and announced it would purchase up $600 billion 
agency mortgage-backed securities and agency debt. The decision was made two months 
before the Obama’s inauguration day. Consequently, the combined effect of the monetary 
policy shocks and the quantitative easing package contributed to the high volatility of the 
monetary aggregates during the Obama’s presidential terms in the White House.
                                                             
14 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/historical-approaches-to-monetary-policy.htm  
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TABLE 2. 1 THE GROWTH RATES OF THE MONETARY AGGREGATES ACROSS THE U.S PRESIDENTIAL CYCLES 
Notes: The figures are adjusted for seasonality and consumer price index. Column 2 shows the official presidential terms. Following (Pastor and Veronesi, 2017), we adopt 
the inauguration day as the beginning of each presidential term. Although, Eisenhower’s office period started in 1953, we do not count his presidential term until 01/1959 
when the data set starts to cover. The disruptions of the presidential terms are linked to the certain political events such Kennedy’s assassination in 11/1963 and Nixon’s 
resignation in 08/1974.  
President (Party) Period in office 
M1 M2 Money Multiplier 
Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. 
Panel A. By President 
Dwight Eisenhower (R) 01/1959-01/1961 1.47 4.11 5.27 2.75 -0.017 0.0091 
John F. Kennedy (D) 02/1961-11/1963 2.75 2.45 6.54 1.35 -0.044 0.0078 
Lyndon B. Johnson (D) 12/1963-01/1969 4.28 4.21 4.55 2.51 -0.033 0.0079 
Richard M. Nixon (R) 02/1969-07/1974 3.81 4.33 6.24 5.28 -0.066 0.0092 
Gerald R. Ford (R) 08/1974-01/1977 1.98 4.23 8.76 4.63 -0.063 0.0096 
James E. Carter (D) 02/1977-01/1981 3.10 6.48 3.92 3.37 -0.082 0.0081 
Ronald W. Reagan (R) 02/1981-01/1989 6.04 7.56 5.71 5.06 -0.027 0.0074 
George H.W. Bush (R) 02/1989-01/1993 4.47 6.61 0.93 3.08 -0.046 0.0059 
William J. Clinton (D) 02/1993-01/2001 -0.79 6.15 2.09 3.62 -0.063 0.0046 
George W. Bush (R) 02/2001-01/2009 3.15 14.19 4.84 6.39 -0.041 0.0125 
Barack H. Obama (D) 02/2009-01/2017 8.42 11.15 7.72 4.61 -0.007 0.0076 
Donald J. Trump (R) 02/2017-09/2017 5.96 14.91 3.76 3.65 -0.009 0.0045 
Panel B. By Party 
Political party Total months in office 
M1 M2 Money Multiplier 
Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. 
Republicans 370 3.95 7.99 5.16 4.41 -0.038 0.0083 
Democrats 335 3.35 6.09 4.93 3.09 -0.046 0.0051 
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Table 2.2 presents the results of unit root tests for the log of the U.S monetary aggregates across 
the sample period. We employ three different, widely applied unit root tests. Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips Perron (PP) tests are performed under the null hypothesis that 
the series contains a unit root against the alternative that the series are stationary. The PP test 
is the modified version of the ADF test as it accounts for the serial correlation in the 
innovations. Conversely, KPSS test assumes that the observed time series are stationary around 
the deterministic trend (i.e trend stationary) against the alternative of a unit root.  
The results from the three tests demonstrate that the U.S monetary aggregates contain a unit 
root throughout the sample period. Apparently, we fail to reject the ADF and PP tests under 
the null hypothesis that the series follow a unit root process. Meanwhile, the null hypothesis 
that the series are stationary around the deterministic trend is significantly rejected with KPSS 
test.  It is also revealed the first differences (i.e growth rates) of the underlying monetary 
aggregates are stationary. Concluding from the respective p values, the null hypothesis that the 
first differences are unit root processes are significantly rejected under the ADF and PP tests 
whereas fails to reject the null hypothesis of the stationarity for the KPSS test.  
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TABLE 2. 2 UNIT ROOT TEST FOR THE U.S. MONETARY AGGREGATES 
Notes: The series are converted into the natural logarithm values before carrying out the unit root tests. By definition, the null hypothesis of ADF and Philips Perron test are 
imposed as the series contain unit root whereas KPSS test assumes series are stationary under the null hypothesis.   
ADF test; 𝑯𝟎: Series contain unit root 
 M1 M2 Money Multiplier 
P value 
Level 0.97 0.99 0.64 
First difference 0.00 0.00 0.00 
KPSS test; 𝑯𝟎: Series are stationary 
 M1 M2 Money Multiplier 
P value 
Level 0.01 0.00 0.00 
First difference 0.65 0.64 0.73 
Philips-Perron test; 𝑯𝟎: Series contain unit root 
 M1 M2 Money Multiplier 
P value 
Level 0.99 0.99 0.73 
First difference 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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2.3.2 Methodology 
 
We start our empirical estimations with linear models which were previously employed in 
exploring other areas of the partisan gap in economics and finance. To build the baseline 
models, we define our political variable as 𝜋𝑡 following Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and 
run the following regression:  
                                             ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                              (2.1) 
Where the left-hand side variable is log growth rate of the underlying monetary aggregate and  
𝜋𝑡 is the political variable included as an additive dummy indicate the Republican presidencies 
as 1, alternatively 0 for the Democratic presidents. Alternatively defining:  
𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 1 if a Republican is in office at time 𝑡; 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 0 otherwise 
                           and 
𝐷𝐷𝑡 = 1 if a Democrat is in office at time 𝑡; 𝐷𝐷𝑡 = 0 otherwise 
Then regression (2.1) can also be estimated as with two dummies (and without intercept) as in 
Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003): 
                                        ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑅𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                       (2.2) 
The lagged coefficients are shown to be the main explanatory variables for monetary 
aggregates growth rates (Nelson, 2003). Therefore, in the second step, we allow the 
autoregressive components in the equation (2.1) to examine the ability to eliminate the 
significance of the partisan gap: 
                                 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                             (2.3)                
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Following Blinder and Watson (2016), we choose the optimal number of lags for the 
autoregressive component based on SBIC information criteria due to the fact AIC inherently 
choose a higher order model that is not necessary in this study.  
In previous equations, we assess the relation between growth rates of the underlying monetary 
aggregates and two political regimes. Following Sy and Zaman (2011), we next allow the 
coefficients of the autoregressive components change across the presidential cycles, so called 
multiplicative dummies given as follows: 
                    ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + ∑ (𝜌𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡)∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                               (2.4) 
Where (𝜌𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡) implies that, the coefficients of lagged growth rates of monetary aggregates 
can be different under different political regimes. 
Monetary policy decisions are considered an important determination of monetary aggregates. 
Hence, we control for the federal funds rate by augmenting the equation (2.3). Specifically, 
following Blinder and Watson (2016), we estimate the model based on the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag Specification given by: 
                ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑗∆𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                (2.5) 
where 𝑖 is the federal funds rate defined15 as the interest rate at which depository institutions 
trade federal funds with each other overnight.  
For the first time in the literature, we employ non-linear Markov Switching models to provide 
further evidence. Since the White House has been governed by only the Republicans and the 
Democrats parties, switching models can be applied to model US monetary liquidity in two 
political regimes. Non-linear time series models allow underlying variable(s) change under the 
                                                             
15 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS  
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existence of different regimes, so called state-dependent models (Gonzalez-Rivera and Hwy 
Lee, 2008). In spite of the large number of non-linear models in econometric literature, 
Hamilton (1989, 1990) and Tong (1983, 1990) are considered as two widely applied models in 
financial time series (Brooks, 2014).  
Markov switching model 
The first class of non-linear model we employ is the Markov switching model with two separate 
regimes. We denote the republican presidencies in White House as “republican regime” 
(regime 1) and the democrat presidencies in office as “democrat regime” (regime 2) Under 
Markov switching models, underlying monetary liquidity variables 𝑦𝑡 switches regime 
according to some unobserved state variables 𝑠𝑡 , takes two values. In other words, when 𝑠𝑡 is 
equal 1, we will observe pattern of the US monetary liquidity in regime 1, “republican 
regimes”, otherwise st takes value 2, the dependent variables will be observed in regime 2, 
“democrat regime”. The model assumes the movements of the state variable between regimes 
are governed by a Markov process which can be expressed as  
                           𝑃[𝑎 < 𝑦𝑡 ≤ 𝑏|𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑡−1] = 𝑃[𝑎 < 𝑦𝑡 ≤ 𝑏|𝑦𝑡−1]                                (2.6)                  
The equation states that the probability distribution of the state at any time 𝑡 depends only on 
the state at time 𝑡 − 1 not on the states that were passed through at times 𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 − 3, .. 
Therefore, Markov process are not path dependent (Brooks, 2014).  
In a two-regime model, Hamilton (1989) defines an unobserved, latent state variable denoted 
as 𝑧𝑡 evaluated in the first order Markov process 
                             𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑧𝑡 = 1|𝑧𝑡−1 = 1] = 𝑝11                                                                    (2.7) 
                             𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑧𝑡 = 2|𝑧𝑡−1 = 1] = 1 − 𝑝11                                                             (2.8) 
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                             𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑧𝑡 = 2|𝑧𝑡−1 = 2] = 𝑝22                                                                    (2.9) 
                             𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑧𝑡 = 1|𝑧𝑡−1 = 2] = 1 − 𝑝22                                                           (2.10) 
Where 𝑝11   and 𝑝22 denote the probability in regime one, given that the system was in regime 
one during the previous period and the probability of being in regime two, given that the system 
was in regime two during the previous period, respectively. Accordingly, 1 − 𝑝11 defines the 
probability that 𝑦𝑡 will change from state one in the period 𝑡 − 1, to state two in the period 𝑡 
and 1 − 𝑝22 defines the probability of a shift from state two to state 1 between times 𝑡 − 1 and 
𝑡. Based on this specification, 𝑧𝑡 evolves as an AR (1) process 
                                      𝑧𝑡 = (1 − 𝑝11) + 𝜌𝑧𝑡−1 +  𝜗𝑡                                                          (2.11) 
Where 𝜌 = 𝑝11 + 𝑝22 − 1. In our case, assuming the US monetary aggregates follow a Markov 
process, to forecast the probability in a given regime during the next period, we have to find 
out the current period probability and a set of transition probabilities given for the case of 
“republican regime” and “democrat regime”. 
To get a univariate Markov switching model, we use an autoregressive 𝑝 order process for the 
underlying monetary aggregates 𝑦𝑡 which can be specified as follows: 
                            𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖,𝑠𝑡−𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜎𝑠𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝜀𝑡                                                           (2.12) 
Where the parameters in the regression (2.2) can be defined as: 
                            𝜇𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇1(1 − 𝑆𝑡) + 𝜇2𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇1 + (𝜇2 − 𝜇1)                                             (2.13) 
                  𝜌𝑖,𝑆𝑡−𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖,0(1 − 𝑆𝑡−𝑖) + 𝜌𝑖,1𝑆𝑡−𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖,0 + (𝜌𝑖,1 − 𝜌𝑖,0)𝑆𝑡−𝑖                             (2.14) 
                  𝜎𝑆𝑡 = 𝜎0(1 − 𝑆𝑡) + 𝜎1𝑆𝑡 = 𝜎0 (1 +
(𝜎1−𝜎0)
𝜎0
𝑆𝑡) = 𝜎0(1 + ℎ𝑆𝑡)                         (2.15) 
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Where 𝜇𝑆𝑡is the regression constant that defines 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 as the regression means for the 
“republican regime” and “democrat regime”, respectively; 𝜌𝑖,𝑆𝑡−𝑖 is the slope coefficient for 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ order regression term; 𝜎𝑆𝑡  is the standard deviation; 𝜀𝑡 is a zero mean and unit variance 
shock; 𝑆𝑡 is the Markov switching variable takes value 0 at the “republican regime” and value 
1 for the “democrat regime”. The transition probabilities are assumed to be time-invariant and 
constant over time.  
TABLE 2. 3 THE U.S. MONETARY AGGREGATES ACROSS THE PRESIDENTIAL CYCLES 
Notes: The table reports the empirical results based on the following regressions: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑅𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
All the data covers the period from 1959:01 to 2017:09. The growth rates of the monetary aggregates are 
annualized by multiplying the monthly growth rates by 12. The numbers in the parentheses below the coefficients 
of “RD” and “DD” dummies represent p values under the null hypothesis that the estimated growth rates are not 
significantly different from zero. The p values of the tests are calculated using Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation robust t-statistics following Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003).  The p 
values under the coefficients in the “Diff” column is also obtained from Newey-West test indicating the null 
hypothesis that the monetary aggregates growth rates across the democrat and the republican presidencies are 
not significantly different from each other. The row “T/Republicans” indicates the number of observations and 
the number of the months that republican presidents are in the office throughout the sample period.   
 The ?̅?2  row displays the average adjusted 𝑅2   during full sample and the first four years. The symbols *, **, 
*** are used indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
Monetary Aggregates Full Sample First Terms 
 RD DD Diff RD DD Diff 
M1 13.19*** 
(0.00) 
18.34*** 
(0.00) 
-5.15*** 
(0.00) 
13.56*** 
(0.00) 
13.37*** 
(0.00) 
0.19* 
(0.07) 
M2 59.28*** 
(0.00) 
68.4*** 
(0.00) 
-9.12*** 
(0.00) 
53.18*** 
(0.00) 
40.32*** 
(0.00) 
12.85** 
(0.03) 
MM -
0.036*** 
(0.00) 
-0.042*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.10) 
-
0.036*** 
(0.00) 
-0.056*** 
(0.00) 
0.0198** 
(0.03) 
T/Republicans 705/370 435/255 
?̅?𝟐 0.03 0.01 
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2.4 Empirical Results 
 
We start with the significance of the correlation test between U.S monetary aggregates and 
political cycles by using an additive dummy variable which represents political parties in the 
USA. After estimating regression (2.2), we re-estimate the monetary aggregates across the 
political parties based on the equation (2.1) for the full sample period. Subsequently, we 
eliminate the second presidential terms from the data to examine the previous empirical 
findings that the partisan gap in the economic variables might be much stronger while 
considering only the first four years16 in the office rather than full presidential period (Blinder 
and Watson, 2016).  
Table 2.3 reports the significance of the correlation between growth rates of the underlying U.S 
monetary aggregates and the additive dummy variable indicating two political parties in the 
repeated manner. We conduct regression (2.1) and regression (2.2) across the full sample and 
only first four years of the presidential periods, accordingly. During the full sample period, 
from 1959:01 to 2017:09, real growth rate of the U.S narrow money aggregate (i.e M1) is on 
average 18.34 percent per year under the Democratic presidencies versus 13.19 percent under 
the Republican presidential terms in the office. The Democratic partisan gap amounting 5.15 
percent is found to be statistically and economically significant. Likewise, real growth rate of 
the broader money aggregate considered as M2 is found on average 68.4 percent per year under 
the Democratic presidencies whereas 59.28 percent during the Republicans’ office periods. The 
suggested 9.12 percent Democratic partisan gap is found even more economically meaningful 
than M1 aggregate.  We can observe similar findings for the money multiplier, albeit the growth 
difference across the political cycles appears less significant. 
                                                             
16 Even more robust in the first years 
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Surprisingly, the partisan gap in the monetary aggregates during the first presidential terms is 
found exactly opposite to the results of the full sample period. The growth rates of the 
underlying monetary aggregates are found to be more favourable under the Republican 
president in the office than the Democratic presidencies. The growth differences of the money 
aggregates are found to be statistically significant, albeit less economically notable. This 
finding is contrary to what Blinder and Watson (2016) found for the partisan gap in economic 
output.  
TABLE 2. 4 MONETARY AGGREGATES CONTROLLED BY AUTOREGRESSIVE COMPONENTS 
Notes: The table represents the statistical results based on the following regression: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
+ 𝛽𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
All the data covers the period from 1959:01 to 2017:09. The optimal lag length is chosen with SIC information 
criteria which determines two lags for the M1 and M2 equations, while only AR(1) component for the MM 
equation. In the table, 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 indicate the coefficients of AR (1) and AR (2) components, respectively. The 
political variable is measured by 𝜋𝑡 which indicates 1 if a Republican president is in the office, otherwise 0 if a 
Democrat president is in the office. Under the null hypothesis, the political variable should not be significantly 
different from zero.  The numbers in the parentheses shows the p values to present the statistical significance of 
the coefficients.  The p values of the tests are calculated using Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and serial-
correlation robust t-statistics. The regression performance is given by 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  in last column. The symbols *, **, *** 
are used indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.    
 𝝁𝒕  𝝆𝟏 𝝆𝟐 𝝅 𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
M1 0.96*** 
(0.00) 
0.11*** 
(0.00) 
0.27*** 
(0.00) 
-0.29*** 
(0.00) 
0.21 
M2 2.21*** 
(0.00) 
0.47*** 
(0.00) 
0.14*** 
(0.00) 
-0.35*** 
(0.00) 
0.41 
MM -0.003*** 
(0.00) 
0.27*** 
(0.00) 
- -0.001* 
(0.09) 
0.15 
 
Table 2.4 presents the statistical results of the estimating equation (2.3) which allows 
autoregressive components in assessing the presidential gap in the growth rates of monetary 
aggregates. The number of AR lags is determined with SIC criteria which allow two lags for 
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the M1 and M2 equations, while only one lag for the MM equation. The maximum number of 
lags is chosen based on the frequency of the data (i.e if it is monthly, then 12) following the 
rule of thumb. 
As one might expect the AR lags are found to be positive and highly significant at the 1 percent 
level.  However, it does not eliminate the significance of the political variable. The additive 
dummy indicating the presidential parties is still significant for all three equations albeit less 
economically noticeable for the MM equation. The positive Democratic gap (or negative 
Republican) in the growth of the monetary aggregates remains significant after controlling for 
the lagged growth rates as explanatory variables.  
In the previous estimations, we measured the presidential gap in the monetary aggregates 
growth rates by only additive dummy. Table 2.5 reports the empirical results based on the 
equation (2.4) which allows the coefficients of AR lags change across the presidential parties 
by simultaneously enabling the previously estimated additive dummy. The table exhibits 
interesting findings. The coefficients of the multiplicative dummies, as expected, are negative 
indicating the positive democratic gap (or negative republican gap) in the coefficients of AR 
lags and statistically significant in the all three equations. Moreover, after controlling for the 
multiplicative dummies, the additive dummies become less significant, albeit still 
economically meaningful.  
One the one hand, this finding might be explained by the relative explanatory power of 
multiplicative political variable over the additive political dummy.  On the other hand, 
however, it can be due to the merely econometrical reasons. We controlled both political 
variables in the same equation which may potentially increase the chance of the existence of 
the multicollinearity problem in the regression, even if 𝑅2 value deliberately increases. 
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Nevertheless, the additive political variables for the M1 and M2 equations are still significant 
at 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively whereas insignificant in the MM equation.  
TABLE 2. 5 MONETARY AGGREGATES WITH CONTROLLED BY AUTOREGRESSIVE 
COMPONENTS AND MULTIPLICATIVE POLITICAL DUMMIES 
Notes: The table represents the statistical results based on the following regression: 
                                     ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + ∑ (𝜌𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡)∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                 
All the data covers the period from 1959:01 to 2017:09.  The optimal lag length is chosen with SIC information 
criteria which determines two lags for the M1 and M2 equations, while only AR(1) component for the MM 
equation. In the equation, 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 indicate the coefficients of AR (1) and AR (2) components, respectively. The 
political variable is measured by  𝜋𝑡, an additive dummy variable which indicates 1 if a Republican president is 
in the office, otherwise 0 if a Democrat president is in the office. In the meantime, multiplicative dummies are 
added to the AR coefficients to measure the changes in the coefficients across the political cycles. Under null 
hypothesis the political variable should not be significantly different from zero.  The numbers in the parentheses 
shows the p values present the statistical significance of the coefficients.  The p values of the tests are calculated 
using Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation robust t-statistics. The regression 
performance is given by 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  in last column. The symbols *, **, *** are used indicate the statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.     
 𝝁𝒕 𝝆𝟏  𝝆𝟏*𝝅 𝝆𝟐 𝝆𝟐*𝝅 𝝅 𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
M1 0.91*** 
(0.00) 
0.16*** 
(0.00) 
-0.11** 
(0.03) 
0.25*** 
(0.00) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.05) 
-0.197* 
(0.07) 
0.29 
M2 2.12*** 
(0.00) 
0.43*** 
(0.00) 
-0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.21*** 
(0.00) 
-0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-0.17** 
(0.05) 
0.48 
MM -0.001** 
(0.04) 
0.18*** 
(0.00) 
-0.15** 
(0.05) 
- - 0.00 
(0.14) 
0.20 
 
The money supply is thought to be linked to monetary policy. One might suspect that the 
presidential gap in the monetary aggregates growth rates could be merely explained by the 
monetary policy decisions. Hence, we control the federal funds rate in the estimations based 
on the equation (2.5). Following Blinder and Watson (2016) on studying the partisan gap in 
the economic output, we model the growth rates of the monetary aggregates in the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag framework which allows the current and lagged values of the 
federal funds rates as well as the lagged values of the growth rates of monetary aggregates as 
the explanatory variables. Consistent with the previous estimation, the optimal lag length is 
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determined with SIC criteria. Meanwhile, the political variable is modelled with an additive 
dummy variable  
Table 2.6 reports the findings. Apparently, the SIC criteria choose a lag of federal funds for the 
M1 equation while leaves only contemporaneous values for the M2 and MM equations. As 
expected, the federal funds rates are highly significant and negatively linked to the monetary 
aggregates growth rates. However, an interesting finding is that the partisan gap becomes even 
stronger after controlling for the funds rate. The coefficients of the dummy variable are found 
to be highly significant; the absolute values of the coefficients are even higher than the previous 
estimations.  
Table 2.7 and 2.8 report the findings of Markov Switching Autoregressive model and its 
transition probabilities. In the estimations, we allowed the intercept and the volatilities to 
change across the regimes, while remaining the AR coefficients constant (i.e non-switching 
regressors).  The switching intercepts and volatilities are found significant and economically 
meaningful. The democratic presidential periods in the office are observed with higher growth 
rates whereas low growth rates are associated with the republican office periods. As expected, 
the AR coefficients are mostly positive and highly significant, except AR (2) in the M2 
equation. It is clear from Table 2.8 that the regimes are highly stable with less than 10% 
probability that the monetary aggregates may shift from a low growth rate state (the republican 
state) to a high growth state (the democratic state) or vice versa. The monetary aggregates 
growth rates tend to exhibit path dependence as dictated by the theory of Markov process.  
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TABLE 2. 6   MODELLING MONETARY AGGREGATES WITH AUTOREGRESSIVE COMPONENTS 
CONTROLLED BY POLITICAL DUMMY AND FED FUND RATES 
 
Notes: The table represents the statistical results based on the following ARDL regression: 
                         ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑗∆𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                             
All the data covers the period from 1959:01 to 2017:09.  The optimal distributed lag length is chosen with SIC 
information criteria which determines two lags for the growth rate of M1 and the growth rate of the federal funds 
rate in the first row. M2 equation, however, is specified only AR (1) component and the contemporaneous funds 
rate followed by the fixed repressor political variable. The Money Multiplier equation is determined by only AR 
(1) and the contemporaneous value of the funds rate. In the equation, 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 indicate the coefficients of AR (1) 
and AR (2) components while 𝜑0 and 𝜑1 represent the current and lagged value of the federal funds rate. The 
political variable is measured by  𝜋𝑡, an additive dummy variable which indicates 1 if a Republican president is 
in the office, otherwise 0 if a Democrat president is in the office. Under null hypothesis the political variable 
should not be significantly different from zero.  The numbers in the parentheses shows the p values present the 
statistical significance of the coefficients.  The p values of the tests are calculated using Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation robust t-statistics. The regression performance is given by 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  in last 
column. The last column presents the F statistics results under the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of the 
repressors are simultaneously equal to zero.  The symbols *, **, *** are used indicate the statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.    
  
 𝝁𝒕 𝝆𝟏  𝝆𝟐 𝝋𝟎 𝝋𝟏 𝝅 𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  Pr(Fstat
) 
M1 1.08*** 
(0.00) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.26*** 
(0.00) 
-2.25* 
(0.10) 
-3.89*** 
(0.01) 
-0.48*** 
(0.00) 
0.34 0.00 
M2 2.41*** 
(0.00) 
0.46*** 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.21) 
-8.73*** 
(0.00) 
- -0.58*** 
(0.00) 
0.54 0.00 
MM -0.29*** 
(0.00) 
0.22*** 
(0.00) 
- 0.02*** 
(0.00 
- 0.04** 
(0.05) 
0.25 0.00 
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TABLE 2. 7 MODELLING THE U.S. MONETARY AGGREGATES WITH MARKOV SWITCHING MODEL 
Notes: The table represents the statistical results based on the following Markov Switching Autoregressive model 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖,𝑠𝑡−𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜎𝑠𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝜀𝑡 
All the data covers the period from 1959:01 to 2017:09. The optimal AR lags is chosen based on the findings from the previous estimations. We allow intercept and volatility 
to change across the regimes while remaining the autoregressive coefficients constant. 𝑁1and 𝑁2 denote the number of observations through the republican and the democrat 
regimes. Last two columns show the average expected duration of two regimes across the equations. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the p values.  
Statistic 𝝁𝟏 𝝁𝟐 𝝈𝟏
𝟐 𝝈𝟐
𝟐 AR(1) AR(2) 𝑵𝟏 𝑵𝟐 𝒅𝟏 𝒅𝟐 
M1 -0.33 
(0.00) 
0.60 
(0.00) 
0.83 
(0.09) 
3.36 
(0.00) 
0.43 
(0.00) 
0.22 
(0.00) 
370 332 27.84 12.85 
M2 3.04 
(0.00) 
10.11 
(0.00) 
0.70 
(0.00) 
2.03 
(0.00) 
0.68 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.39) 
370 332 44.19 94.58 
MM -0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-4.13 
(0.00) 
5.19 
(0.00) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
- 370 332 10.69 39.81 
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TABLE 2. 8 THE TRANSITION PROBABILITIES OF THE MARKOV SWITCHING AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL 
Notes: The table represents the transition probabilities under the Markov Switching model 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑧𝑡 = 1|𝑧𝑡−1 = 1] = 𝑝11 
                                                                                                                   𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑧𝑡 = 2|𝑧𝑡−1 = 1] = 1 − 𝑝11 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑧𝑡 = 2|𝑧𝑡−1 = 2] = 𝑝22 
                                                                                                                   𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑧𝑡 = 1|𝑧𝑡−1 = 2] = 1 − 𝑝22 
 
In the equations, 𝑝11   and 𝑝22 denote the probability in regime one, given that the system was in regime one during the previous period and the probability of being in regime 
two, given that the system was in regime two during the previous period, respectively. Accordingly, 1 − 𝑝11 defines the probability that 𝑦𝑡  will change from state one in the 
period 𝑡 − 1, to state two in the period 𝑡 and 1 − 𝑝22 defines the probability of a shift from state two to state 1 between times 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡.  
Statistic 𝒑𝟏𝟏 𝒑𝟏𝟐 𝒑𝟐𝟐 𝒑𝟐𝟏 
M1 0.96 0.04 0.92 0.08 
M2 0.98 0.02 0.99 0.01 
MM 0.91 0.09 0.97 0.03 
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Fed chairs have political views either having party membership or an ideological outlook. More 
importantly, the Fed governing cycles are independent17 from presidential cycles, as there has 
been a long tradition that the presidents allow for the continuation of the current chair even if 
he/she is a member of the rival party. The only exception can be considered the most recent 
case that president Trump removed Janet Yellen at the end of her first term.  
In Table 2.9, we present descriptive statistics of the growth rates of the U.S Monetary 
Aggregates under partisan Fed chair cycles. Although Democrats are represented with four, 
Republicans with three governors, Republican Fed governors are reported to be 413 months in 
the office compared to 291 months of Democrats. In annualized percentage growth term, M1 
and MM are observed to be higher under Democrat Fed governors (4.9% and -0.42%, 
respectively) than the Republicans (4.2% and -6.51%, respectively) whereas the opposite for 
M2 being 5.16% and 5.04% for Republicans and Democrats, respectively.   
The U.S monetary policy history of last 50-60 years may suggest us to hypothesize that whether 
partisan FED chairs are able to explain the presidential gap in the monetary aggregates. For 
instance, we already know that Paul Volcker (Democrat) was quite successful in curbing high 
inflation inherited from the Arthur Burns’s (Republican) governing years (Silber, 2012). Alan 
Greenspan (Republican) is known his ultra-liberal views on the financial regulation which is 
partially blamed18 for dotcom bubble as well as 2008-2009 crisis. We test the significance of 
partisan FED chair gap in explaining the presidential gap in the monetary aggregates. Firstly, 
we carry out the significance of the correlation analysis as done for the presidential gap in Table 
2.10. 
                                                             
17 https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/boardmembership.htm  
18 https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html  
75 
 
TABLE 2. 9 THE REAL GROWTH RATES OF THE MONETARY AGGREGATES ACROSS THE U.S PRESIDENTIAL CYCLES 
 
 
FED Chair (Party) Period in Office 
M1 M2 MM 
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
Panel A. By FED Cahir 
William Martin (D) 01/1959-01/1970 2.99 3.96 5.97 2.78 -1.31 3.85 
Arthur F. Burns (R) 02/1970-01/1978 3.99 4.21 7.65 4.83 -3.46 5.08 
G. William Miller (D) 03/1978-08/1979 3.91 4.28 3.64 1.92 -4.09 4.19 
Paul A. Volcker (D) 09/1979-08/1987 5.87 8.33 5.6 5.28 -2.19 6.86 
Alan Greenspan (R) 09/1987-01/2006 1.56 8.06 2.97 4.15 -5.07 7.39 
Ben Bernanke (R) 02/2006-01/2014 7.06 14.82 4.86 6.42 -10.99 44.09 
Janet Yellen (D) 02/2014-09/2017 6.69 10.94 4.95 3.12 5.94 31.34 
Panel B. By Party 
Political Party Total months in 
office 
M1   
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation 
Republicans 413 4.2 9.03 5.16 5.13 -6.51 18.85 
Democrats 291 4.9 6.9 5.04 3.28 -0.42 11.56 
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TABLE 2. 10 THE U.S MONETARY AGGREGATES GROWTH RATES ON THE PARTISAN FED 
CHAIRS CYCLES 
  
Notes: The table reports the empirical results based on the following regressions: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑅𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
All the data covers the period from 1959:01 to 2017:09. The growth rates of the monetary aggregates are 
annualized by multiplying the monthly growth rates by 12. The numbers in the parentheses below the coefficients 
of “RD” and “DD” dummies represent p values under the null hypothesis that the estimated growth rates are not 
significantly different from zero. The p values of the tests are calculated using Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation robust t-statistics following Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003).  The p 
values under the coefficients in the “Diff” column is also obtained from Newey-West test indicating the null 
hypothesis that the monetary aggregates growth rates across the democrat and the republican FED cycles are 
not significantly different from each other. The row “T/Republicans” indicates the number of observations and 
the number of the months that republican FED chairs are in the office throughout the sample period.   
The symbols *, **, *** are used indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively.  
 RD DD Diff 
M1 12.36*** 
(0.00) 
27.24*** 
(0.00) 
-14.88*** 
(0.00) 
M2 56.76*** 
(0.00) 
87.96*** 
(0.00) 
-31.2*** 
(0.00) 
MM -0.05*** 
(0.00) 
-0.03*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
T/Republicans 705/547 
 
Table 2.10 shows that there is an economically and statistically significant Democratic (or 
negative Republican) Fed chair gap in the growth rates of narrow and broad money indicators. 
Although, money multiplier is also found to be significant, it is economically less notable. 
Remarkable Democratic gap is found as much as 14.88 and 31.2 percent for the M1 and M2 
growth rates, respectively which apparently outperform respective presidential gaps.  
Afterwards, for the first time in the literature, we check the statistical significance of partisan 
Fed chair gap in explaining the presidential gap. As emphasized above, we can simultaneously 
model partisan the Fed chair gap with the presidential gap in the same equation, as there is no 
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direct relationship between them based on the structure of the U.S political system. In other 
words, the equation will not suffer from multicollinearity problem. Therefore, we include the 
Fed chair variable in the equation (2.1) to check the possible explanatory power of partisan Fed 
chair in explaining the presidential gap. Under the null hypothesis, the coefficient of partisan 
Fed chair should not be significantly different from zero.  
TABLE 2. 11 THE U.S MONETARY AGGREGATES IN THE PARTISAN FED CHAIR AND 
PRESIDENTIAL CYCLES 
  
Notes: The table reports the empirical results based on the following regressions: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽1𝜋𝐹𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽2𝜋𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑢𝑡 
All the data covers the period from 1959:01 to 2017:09. The growth rates of the monetary aggregates are 
annualized by multiplying the monthly growth rates by 12. The numbers in the parentheses below the coefficients 
of 𝜋𝐹𝐸𝐷  and  𝜋𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 dummies represent p values under the null hypothesis that the estimated growth rates are not 
significantly different from zero. The p values of the tests are calculated using Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation robust t-statistics following Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003).  The row 
“T/Republicans” indicates the number of observations and the number of the months that republican FED chairs 
are in the office throughout the sample period. The symbols *, **, *** are used indicate the statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
 
 𝝁 𝝅𝑭𝑬𝑫 𝝅𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔 
M1 2.52*** 
(0.00) 
-1.26*** 
(0.00) 
-0.45 
(0.12) 
M2 7.78*** 
(0.00) 
-2.63*** 
(0.00) 
-0.81 
(0.11) 
MM -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 
 
Finally, to test the robustness of the explanatory power of the partisan Fed chair gap, we control 
autoregressive components of the monetary aggregates in the same equation. As previously 
carried out, the optimal lag length is chosen with SBIC information criteria. 
 
78 
 
TABLE 2. 12 THE U.S MONETARY AGGREGATES CONTROLLED BY AUTOREGRESSIVE 
COMPONENTS IN THE PARTISAN FED CHAIR AND PRESIDENTIAL CYCLES    
Notes: The table represents the statistical results based on the following regression: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
+ 𝛽1𝜋𝐹𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽2𝜋𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑢𝑡 
All the data covers the period from 1959:01 to 2017:09. The optimal lag length is chosen with SIC information 
criteria which determines two lags for the M1 and M2 equations, while only AR(1) component for the MM 
equation. The political variable is measured by 𝜋𝑡 which indicates 1 if a Republican is in the office, otherwise 0 
if a Democrat is in the office. Under the null hypothesis, the political variable should not be significantly different 
from zero.  The numbers in the parentheses shows the p values to present the statistical significance of the 
coefficients.  The p values of the tests are calculated using Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and serial-
correlation robust t-statistics. The symbols *, **, *** are used indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance levels, respectively.    
 𝝁𝒕 AR (1) AR (2) 𝝅𝑭𝑬𝑫 𝝅𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔 
M1 2.45*** 
(0.00) 
0.11*** 
(0.00) 
0.26*** 
(0.00) 
-1.18*** 
(0.00) 
-0.45 
(0.31) 
M2 2.36*** 
(0.00) 
0.47*** 
(0.00) 
0.14*** 
(0.00) 
-0.89** 
(0.03) 
-0.38 
(0.44) 
MM -0.002** 
(0.05) 
0.27*** 
(0.00) 
- -0.03* 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.93) 
 
Table 2.11 apparently shows that the Fed chair gap remains its power in explaining the 
presidential gap even after controlling for the autoregressive components. 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We explore the presidential gap in U.S monetary aggregates. The consistent findings regarding 
the partisan gap in the U.S economic output (Blinder and Watson, 2016) and stock market 
performance (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003) motivated us to investigate the similar gap in 
the monetary aggregates. Based on strong theoretical and empirical links between monetary 
aggregates and economic activity as well as stock market return, we impose a hypothesis that 
the presidential gap might be present in the monetary aggregates. Additionally, this study 
potentially aims to shed light on the unexplored reasons of excessive growth rates of monetary 
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aggregates over economic activity and monetary policy decisions. The major findings can be 
summarized as the followings. 
A positive and significant democratic gap is existent in the U.S monetary aggregates. While 
the gaps are found as much as 5 percent and 9 percent per annum in the M1 and M2 growth 
rates, respectively, the MM gap is less economically noticeable. The partisan gap remains 
significant after controlling for the autoregressive components and the federal funds rates. The 
presidential gap is not only persistent as an additive component to the growth rates, but also 
highly significant in the coefficients. Hence, the magnitudes of the lagged growth rates are 
sensitive to the presidential cycles. 
The monetary aggregates are also found significantly different under the Democratic FED 
chairs than the Republican governors. The gaps are remarkably high, as much as 14 percent 
and 31 percent in the M1 and M2 growth rates which considerably outperform the similar 
presidential gaps. Moreover, controlling the Fed chair gap sweeps away the statistical 
significance of the presidential gaps. Consequently, the Democratic FED chair gap is found 
more robust partisan gap than the Democratic presidential gap. 
In general, this study might be suggestive to the new way of thinking in the U.S presidential 
puzzle literature. The local partisan gaps might be a more promising way of exploring the 
binary nature of the appropriate growth rather than the whole, country wide political picture.  
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Chapter 3. Commodity Prices and FX Liquidity: A 
GVAR Approach 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The foreign exchange (FX) market is one of the biggest and most liquid in the financial 
markets. As of 2016 data, the average daily market turnover was $5.1 trillion per day (BIS, 
2016).  
In recent years, a considerable number of studies has been dedicated to explore the 
determinants, commonality and the investment implications of FX liquidity (Banti et al., 2012; 
Banti and Phylaktis, 2015; Karnaukh, Ronaldo and Soderlind, 2015; Mancini et al., 2013; 
Menkhoff et al., 2012). Common findings can be summarized as: (i) liquidity risk is priced in 
the cross section of currency returns, especially, the currencies of the emerging economies (ii) 
the TED spread (i.e the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and short term 
U.S government debt) and market volatility are significant commonality factors of FX liquidity 
(iii) local money market rates and capital flows with the country of quoted currency are 
significant determinants of the cross section of the liquidity of floating exchange rates. 
However, none of these papers studies the potential transmission of commodity price 
movements to FX liquidity.  
The linkages between commodity prices and international finance have received some attention 
in the exchange rate literature. The introduction of the concept of “commodity currencies” 
(Chen and Rogoff, 2003) led to the findings that commodity price is an important driver of the 
exchange rate movements under the sticky-price model of an open economy with non-traded 
goods, a portfolio balance model and the terms-of trade hypothesis (Chen, 2004).   
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In the meantime, similar findings are also documented from the other perspective. Exchange 
rates also influence or Granger-cause commodity prices as they are determined by the net 
present value of fundamental asset prices (Zhang et al., 2016; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996; Engel 
and West, 2005; Chen at al., 2010; Alquist et al., 2012). Finally, multiple studies (notably, 
Ferraro et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2010; Zhang, et al., 2016) document that commodity prices 
have the power to forecast exchange rates or vice versa, particularly in the case of “commodity 
currencies”. 
Given the numerous findings on the linkage between commodity prices and exchange rates, it 
is a surprising fact that the FX liquidity literature never, as far as we know, emphasises 
commodity prices as potential determinant or commonality factor. Commodity prices may 
influence FX liquidity from different channels. From the demand side perspective, 
commodities are vital part of international trade flows and this generates a demand for FX 
liquidity, hence can be determinant of FX liquidity. Since commodity prices are one of the 
factors that the exchange rates and economies are linked to each other, it would be a potential 
driver of FX liquidity from the commonality perspective. Finally, as commodity prices may 
significantly influence the local funding conditions especially in economies that are 
significantly exposed to exporting commodities, then they affect FX liquidity from the supply 
side perspective. Considering the channels above that commodity prices may transmit to FX 
liquidity, it is clearly worthwhile exploring whether commodity prices are a determinant of FX 
liquidity.  
Exploring FX liquidity is also of interest to investors. Factor investing is a growing field of 
investment management. It is based on dedicating a specific fund to each factor or building a 
multifactor investment structure (Bender et al., 2013). Liquidity based investment involves 
exploiting a liquidity premium from holding illiquid assets rather than liquid assets. This study 
can be useful to investors who aim to exploit profit opportunities from the liquidity factor in 
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the FX market by introducing commodity prices as an additional tool to model the direction of 
the liquidity of major exchange rates.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we assemble a new dataset for 
CTOT. Specifically, we improve the existing resources in three aspects: 1) We construct CTOT 
at a new monthly frequency which can be useful for other researchers 2) We apply yearly 
updated trading weights of countries’ trade composition to commodity prices in contrast to the 
currently available dataset which has been constructed with fixed weights and 3) We also 
extend the latest available data of 2010 to the end of 2016. We cover 41 countries (of which 19 
are eurozone countries) to cover floating exchange rates over the period 01/1994 to 12/2016. 
The second contribution is exploring the transmission of commodity prices to the cross-
sectional illiquidity of the currencies. We estimate the impulse responses of illiquidity to one- 
unit local CTOT shock. Analogous estimations are carried out on the supply and demand side 
models of liquidity, separately. We also explicitly explore commodity price as a commonality 
factor by taking advantages of a GVAR model.  
The third contribution is applying a GVAR model to the international finance literature. Similar 
works have already been carried out in other areas of finance (see Pesaran et al., 2006; Pesaran 
et al., 2007a; Favero, 2013; Gray et al., 2013). The GVAR model allows us to build a local 
currency specific endogenous FX liquidity model to enable us to estimate the interlinkages of 
FX liquidity among currencies by applying common variables. In this manner, we are able to 
explore CTOT as a domestic and weighted foreign determinant of cross-sectional currency 
illiquidity, while allowing previously known commonality factors (e.g TED spread, VIX, FX 
volatility) to be global variables. In the second stage, we jointly model cross-sectional demand 
and supply side factors together, while defining commodity price as a global variable, therefore 
modelling the commodity price as a commonality factor in FX liquidity. 
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Some clear results emerge from our estimations. First, we find commodity prices do matter for 
FX illiquidity; in particular, the illiquidity of the currencies of developing economies 
experience a persistent fall, following a positive local CTOT shock in the supply side model. 
We do not a find a similar effect for the highly liquid currencies from developed economies 
which might be explained by the high explanatory power of local money market rates and 
global funding conditions, as well as, the influence of short-term trading strategies. In the 
meantime, local CTOT shocks leave a significant but temporary effect on the illiquidity of the 
currencies of developed economies that are relatively more exposed to commodity exporting 
such as AUD, CAD, NZD, ZAR and NOK.  
Second, we find strong evidence for the effect of local CTOT shocks on cross-sectional FX 
illiquidity in the demand side framework. A one-unit standard deviation shock on local CTOT 
is followed by a negative and persistent effect on illiquidity for most currencies excluding the 
highly liquid and some Asian currencies. CTOT shocks stimulate the market demand for the 
local currency and push liquidity up for most currencies. On the other hand, jointly modelling 
capital flows while controlling for market sentiment (VIX) and general market condition 
enhances the effects of CTOT shocks. We can explain the insignificant effect for highly liquid 
currencies (GBP, CHF, EUR, JPY) with the similar reasons in the supply side model.  
Third, we find that the illiquidity of currencies that are considerably exposed to commodity 
exporting, also known as “commodity currencies” (AUD, CAD, BRL, ZAR, NOK, NZD, 
MXN) are significantly influenced by the common commodity price shocks. The currencies of 
small economies (CLP, SEK, PLN, HUF, CZP and DKK) are also significantly influenced by 
commodity price shocks. Consistent with the findings above, highly liquid currencies are not 
significantly affected by common commodity price shocks that might be explained by the 
similar reasons- the impact of local money market rates and global funding conditions, as well 
as, trading strategies.  
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section reviews the literature on 
different aspects of FX liquidity, the featured works on the linkages between commodity prices 
and exchange rates and the theory and practice of GVAR modelling. In the third section, we 
present the data sources, the description of monthly CTOT and the key features of GVAR 
model. The fourth section discusses the empirical findings and the theoretical implications. We 
discuss the major findings with concluding remarks in last section. 
3.2 Related Literature and theoretical underpinnings 
 
3.2.1 Commonality in FX Liquidity 
 
The extant literature explores cross-sectional commonality of liquidity in the stock market and 
several papers find a significant co-movement (Datar et al.,1998; Chordia et al., 2000, 2001; 
Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Lesmond, 2005). For some reason, 
FX market liquidity has not received similar attention until relatively recently perhaps due to 
the to the segmented structure of the FX market and the heterogeneity of economic players 
(Mancini et al., 2013). Commonality in the FX market has been empirically investigated for 
the recent global financial crisis (Melvin and Taylor, 2009; Mancini et al., 2013) suggesting 
that the FX market has expose commonality during the crisis years However, since the time 
span is limited, drawing general conclusion regarding strong commonality is overly ambitious.   
Covering both the crisis and non-crisis years from 1994 to 2008, Banti et al., (2012) find a 
similar co-movement pattern in 20 exchange rates. They additionally document that a liquidity 
risk premium is more prominent in the returns of the emerging market currencies. Extending 
the works carried out using bond and equity markets, Mancini et al. (2013) develop a PCA 
factor model by using intraday data from 2007 to 2009 for testing commonality in the FX 
market and find that commonality in the FX market is more pronounced than in equity markets. 
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Given the relatively short estimation period of previous papers, Karnaukh, Ronaldo and 
Söderlind (2015) empirically test the FX market commonality with a monthly data set covering 
thirty exchange rates from 1991 to 2012. They find a stronger co-movement of FX liquidity in 
distressed markets, especially when combined with the underlying negative determinants of 
FX liquidity such as high volatility, funding constraints and losses of FX speculators.  
3.2.2 Determinants of FX liquidity 
 
Previous studies explore the determinants of FX liquidity in three groups. From demand side 
factors, Banti and Phylaktis (2015) document capital flows as the main driver of the time 
variation of FX liquidity. As large capital flows improve the efficiency of the FX market, they 
are documented to positively influence FX liquidity. In the meantime, volatility is reported as 
the main important determinant of FX market by multiple studies including Menkhoff et al. 
(2012), Lustig, Rousssanov and Verdelhan (2011) and Banti and Phylaktis (2015).  Since 
volatility, typically proxied by VIX, is a measure of financial uncertainty, it negatively 
influences FX liquidity.  
Additionally, Karnaukh, Ronaldo and Söderlind (2015) provide empirical evidence that FX 
liquidity is not just negatively influenced by volatility in the FX market, but also general market 
conditions including bond and stock market liquidity. In recent work, Karnaukh, Ronaldo and 
Söderlind (2015) extend the empirical investigation of the demand side factors to current 
accounts, portfolio balances, and sentiment by using additional proxies. They find that FX 
liquidity declines with the deterioration of investor sentiment, the demand for U.S safe assets 
and depreciation of local currencies.  
The supply side drivers demonstrate to what extent financial intermediaries are inclined to 
provide liquidity during either tight or loose funding (Karnaukh, Ronaldo and Söderlind, 2015). 
In particular, the basic idea is in line with the earlier work of Brunnermier and Pederson (2009) 
86 
 
suggesting a feedback loop effect between market liquidity and funding liquidity. Brunnermier 
and Pederson (2009) document that market liquidity can dry up quickly during lower prices 
and higher volatility of securities. Meanwhile, a deterioration of market liquidity is quickly 
followed by further losses and margin calls, ultimately creating “liquidity spirals”. Drawing on 
the underlying theoretical model, studies (i.e Mancini et al., 2013; Banti and Phylaktis, 2015; 
Karnaukh, Ronaldo and Söderlind, 2015) show evidence that FX liquidity decreases with 
higher money market rates, TED spread and monetary aggregates.  
Finally, Karnaukh, Ronaldo and Söderlind (2015) explore the cross-sectional determinants of 
FX liquidity. Consistent with the time-series explorations, the cross-sectional determinants are 
estimated with demand and supply side characteristics while substituting market conditions 
with economic performance as control variables. They find that higher central bank 
transparency, sovereign credit rating and higher GDP per capita are associated with higher 
commonality in cross-sectional FX liquidity. In other words, institutional factors stimulate 
more international trading. Conversely, the findings imply that local money market rates tend 
to decrease commonality as it induces higher funding costs from the supply side. 
3.2.3 Measurement of FX liquidity 
 
Liquidity is an unobservable phenomenon as real market data do not explicitly reveal liquidity 
of an asset. In practice, the liquidity component is extracted from data based on measurement 
concepts theories such as “tightness”, “depth”, and “resiliency”.  
Bid-ask spread as a transaction cost measure of liquidity is widely applied by academic 
literature and practitioners (Bessembinder, 1994; Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994; Lee, 1994; 
Hsieh and Kleidon, 1996). The bid-ask spread as a measurement, is known to have obvious 
limitations. For example, Grossman and Miller (1988) emphasize the need to be cautious when 
using bid-ask spread as it is an indication of immediate cost of market makers in the 
87 
 
contemporaneous buy and sell transactions. In practice, immediate cost of market makers might 
not be clearly observed since larger transactions might take a longer time to realize.   
Price-impact measures (such as Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Amihud, 2002) are considered 
as alternatives to transaction cost measurements, particularly in the case of estimation with 
lower frequency of data (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009). Vayanes and Wang (2013) 
show that the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure does not suffer from the shortcomings of 
bid-ask spread. In the spirit of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Banti et al. (2012) develop an 
analogous price-impact measure of liquidity in the FX market.  
3.2.4 Commodity Currency 
 
As opposed to standard exchange models which cannot explain the high volatility and 
persistence of the real exchange rate, Chen and Rogoff (2003) introduce the phenomenon of 
commodity currencies by focusing on three OECD economies (Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand) where commodities comprise a significant share of total exports. They show that the 
US dollar price of commodity exports of the underlying countries has a persistent effect on 
their floating exchange rates. 
But why might commodity prices affect currencies? Based on the theoretical relationship 
between the macroeconomy and trade, an increase in the price of commodity fires the demand 
for national currencies of the countries whose exports heavily depend on this particular 
commodity. Thus, exchange rate movements can be predicted via economic indicators such as 
commodity prices. 
The idea that commodity prices can be an important driver of exchange rate movements is 
supported with a sticky-price model of an open economy with non-traded goods, a portfolio-
balance model, and the terms-of-trade hypothesis (Chen and Rogoff, 2003; Chen, 2004). 
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However, studies focusing on the effect of the export side of commodity trading, neglect 
countries that are heavily dependent on the imports of commodities. Moreover, the existing 
commodity currency studies generally emphasize only a few commodities such as crude oil, 
gold and copper. 
A second group of literature explores the opposing relationship arguing that exchange rates 
should influence or Granger-cause commodity prices as they are determined by the net present 
value of fundamental asset prices including commodities (see Zhang et al., 2016; Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1996; Engel and West, 2005; Chen at al., 2010; Alquist et al., 2012).  
Apart from the theoretical works, several studies use an empirical approach to explore whether 
exchange rates have the power to forecast commodity prices (or the other way around) in an 
out-of-sample framework. A common finding is that the theoretical link between exchange 
rates and commodity prices, irrespective of the direction of effect, is statistically more justified 
with relatively high frequency estimation (i.e daily) rather than lower frequency (i.e monthly 
and quarterly) (see Ferraro et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2010; Zhang, et al., 2016).  
However, studies find conflicting results as to whether exchange rates are statistically more 
powerful in forecasting commodity prices or vice versa. Notably, Chen et al. (2010) finds that 
exchange rates of “commodity currencies” have robust statistical power to predict global 
commodity prices while the reverse relationship remains less robust. The theoretical 
explanation is a suggest that exchange rates are strongly forward looking, while commodity 
prices remain fragile with short-term fluctuations.  
Conversely, Ferraro et al. (2015) find both contemporaneous and lagged commodity prices 
(focusing on oil prices) have robust statistical power to forecast exchange rates in daily out-of-
sample forecasting work. Zhang et al. (2016) emphasizes findings from causality analysis at 
multiple horizons. They show evidence that there is strong Granger-causality between 
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commodity prices and exchange rates at multiple horizons in both directions, although the 
direction is statistically stronger from commodity price to exchange rates. It should be noted 
that these findings are robust after controlling for the U.S dollar denomination effect   
3.2.5 Theory and practice of GVAR modelling 
 
The GVAR model, originally developed for credit risk analysis in Pesaran et al. (2004) is a 
systematic tool to assess regional and global macroeconomic interdependences across various 
countries. The model has also a wide range of policy applications (Galesi and Lombardi, 2009; 
Anderton et al., 2010). 
Conceptually, the GVAR encompasses a two-step modelling procedure. In the first step, 
country specific macro-econometric models are estimated using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
models with exogenous variables denoted as VARX*. Country specific models include 
domestic variables and the weighted cross-sectional averages of foreign variables which are 
assumed to be weakly exogenous. In the second step, the country specific models are solved as 
a system in a global VAR model. This approach permits measurement of interdependence 
among cross sections-not only countries but also regions, industries and banks- while allowing 
simultaneously control country specific determinants.  
A number of GVAR applications for finance have been developed in recent years. Credit risk 
modelling on a global perspective (Pesaran et al., 2006), the determinants of portfolio 
diversification across industry sectors and different countries (Pesaran et al., 2007a) are both 
employed as original GVAR applications. Several policy related papers focus on modelling 
different kinds of risk including the determinants of sovereign bond spreads across euro zone 
countries (Favero, 2013), interactions of banking sector risk, sovereign risk, corporate sector 
risk, real economic activity and credit growth of 15 European countries and the U.S (Gray et 
al., 2013).  
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Another major area of GVAR practice is evaluating systemic risk and modelling macro-
financial linkages across regional groups of countries. For instance, Alessandri et al. (2009) 
develop a quantitative model to evaluate the transmission mechanisms of systemic risk to 
banks’ balance sheets via feedback effects of macro-credit risk, interest income risk and market 
risk. The model is widely applied in the macro stress test modelling framework of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) (Foglia, 2009). Chen et al. (2010) also show international evidence for 
macro-financial linkages within domestic and global economies which lead to the transmission 
of bank and corporate default risk at the global level.  
More recent GVAR evidence shows that liquidity shocks are strongly linked to price bubbles 
in global asset markets (Dreger and Wolters, 2011) and the evidence is more pronounced for 
advanced economies (Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011). Cesa-Bianechi et al. (2014) explore the 
linkages between financial market volatility and macroeconomic conditions. They show that 
the transmission of news is more pronounced in financial markets than the real economy. The 
evidence from a GVAR framework suggests that volatility can be considered as an ex-post 
symptom of economic “disease” rather a cause of instability.  
Another interesting application of GVAR framework is investigating the hypothesis that global 
financial cycles determine domestic financial conditions regardless of the exchange regime. 
Georgiadis and Mehl (2014) find evidence from the interrelationships of 59 economies that the 
classical Mundell-Flemming trilemma still remains valid, in spite of globalization and the 
increased country interlinkages in global economy.  
Most notably for our study, a few studies attempt to model global commodity prices, supply 
and demand by applying the GVAR model. Gutierrez and Piras (2013) model a global wheat 
market in the GVAR framework by considering feedback effects between real and financial 
sectors as well food and energy prices. They find that inflationary effects on wheat export 
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prices can be explained by a negative shock to wheat consumption, an increase in oil prices 
and exchange rate devaluations, despite the heterogeneity across wheat export countries. 
Identification of oil shocks is also attempted in the GVAR context. For example, Cashin et al., 
(2014c) shows that economic consequences of supply and demand shocks are inherently 
different. A positive oil demand shock is found to be linked with inflationary pressures, an 
increase in real output, a rise in interest rates and a fall in equity prices while the negative 
impact of adverse oil supply shocks is observed in the economic growth of energy importers. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Commodity terms of trade 
 
The commodity terms-of-trade (CTOT) index, as a comprehensive measurement, was initially 
constructed by Spatafora and Tytell (2009) based on 32 main commodities19 over the period 
1970-2007 and using an annual frequency. Makhlouf, Kellard and Vinogradov (2017) extend 
this dataset to 2010.  
We improve the existing dataset in three aspects: 1) We construct CTOT at a monthly 
frequency which we expect will be useful for other researchers, especially when integrating the 
higher frequency data of financial markets with the lower frequency data of macro-econometric 
variables 2) Previous studies apply time-averaged weights of countries’ trade composition to 
commodity prices. As a result, any fluctuations in CTOT are merely related to the changes in 
global commodity prices (Makhlouf, Kellard and Vinogradov, 2018). We improve this 
approach and update trading weights every year 3) We also extend the latest available data of 
2010 to the end of 2016. We cover 41 countries (of which 19 are eurozone countries) over the 
                                                             
19 Shrimp, Beef, Lamb, Wheat, Rice, Maize, Bananas, Sugar, Coffee, Cocoa, Tea, Soybean meal, Fish meal, 
Hides, Soybeans, Natural Rubber, Log, Cotton, Wool, Iron Ore, Copper, Nickel, Aluminium, Lead, Zinc, Tin, 
Soy oil, Sunflower oil, Palm oil, Coconut oil, Gold, Crude oil 
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period 01/1994 to 12/2016. The reason for choosing these countries to cover floating exchange 
rates over this period. 
The general description of the equation is given as follows: 
                                                  𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 =
∏ (
𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑉𝑇
)
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑇
𝑗
∏ (
𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑉𝑇
)
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑇
𝑗
                                                           (3.1) 
Where 𝑃𝑗𝑡 is the price of commodity 𝑗 at month 𝑡, 𝑀𝑈𝑉𝑡 is a manufacturing unit value index 
of year 𝑇 used as a deflator, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑇(𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑇) is the share of export (import) of commodity 𝑗 in 
country 𝑖′𝑠 GDP, updated every year.  
Taking the logarithm, equation (3.1) can be rewritten as follows: 
                                                  𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑇 − 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑇)ln (
𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑉𝑡
)𝑗                                  (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) demonstrates that country-specific net exports (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑇 − 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑇) determine how a 
country’s index respond to the global commodity price movements ln (
𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑉𝑡
). In our dataset, 
therefore 𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 is not only influenced by the changes in the underlying commodity prices, 
but also a country’s trade composition.  
As this paper aims to explore the transmission of commodity prices to the liquidity of exchange 
rates, 𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 is again computed for euro by weighting eurozone countries with the share of a 
member country’s GDP in the eurozone’s total GDP. Table 3.1 demonstrates summary 
statistics of monthly CTOT.  
The prices of the 32 commodities are collected from the IMF Commodity Price System 
database. The MUV deflator are taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database or 
the World Bank’s database. Exports and imports of individual commodities are obtained from 
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the United Nations’ COMTRADE database. Total GDPs of the countries are collected from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
database.  
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TABLE 3. 1 MONTHLY CTOT OF 23 COUNTRIES/REGIONS FROM 01/1994 TO 12/2016 
CTOT Mean Median Max Minimum Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Probability 
Australia 99.61 99.84 100.37 98.33 0.60 -0.45 -1.34 29.75 0.00 
Canada 99.83 99.68 101.08 98.55 0.65 0.19 -1.31 21.37 0.00 
New Zealand 99.76 99.75 101.53 98.41 0.88 0.18 -1.27 20.03 0.00 
South Africa 99.98 100.01 100.21 99.62 0.13 -0.78 -0.47 58.14 0.00 
Norway 99.98 99.98 100.10 99.87 0.05 0.35 0.09 5.64 0.00 
Brazil 99.90 99.94 100.10 99.39 0.16 -0.99 0.01 44.79 0.00 
Mexico 99.69 99.86 100.47 98.43 0.54 -0.64 -0.76 25.09 0.00 
Malaysia 99.71 99.62 101.32 98.34 0.77 0.01 -0.86 8.49 0.00 
Thailand 96.85 98.30 107.64 84.71 6.25 -0.31 -1.23 21.53 0.00 
Eurozone 99.16 99.88 100.46 95.62 1.62 -1.32 -0.13 79.29 0.00 
Czech 99.99 100.00 100.03 99.95 0.02 -0.46 -0.99 19.38 0.00 
Switzerland 100.03 100.05 100.22 99.79 0.11 -0.23 -1.18 16.30 0.00 
Denmark 99.97 99.90 101.36 99.20 0.52 0.42 -0.84 16.25 0.00 
Turkey 99.99 99.99 100.02 99.94 0.02 -0.42 -0.63 13.06 0.00 
UK 100.01 100.01 100.06 99.97 0.02 0.34 -0.01 5.23 0.00 
Japan 100.26 100.22 101.25 99.22 0.61 0.01 -1.48 24.79 0.00 
Singapore 99.99 99.99 100.75 99.21 0.35 -0.20 -0.67 7.10 0.00 
Chile 99.98 99.99 100.17 99.74 0.10 -0.51 -0.39 13.53 0.00 
Sweden 100.05 100.07 100.44 99.63 0.20 -0.16 -1.16 16.69 0.00 
Poland 100.01 100.01 100.15 99.93 0.05 0.45 -0.16 9.67 0.00 
Korea 99.98 100.07 100.5 99.39 0.27 -0.44 -0.94 19.25 0.00 
Hungary 99.99 100.00 100.02 99.97 0.01 -0.51 -0.71 17.81 0.00 
USA 100.08 100.12 100.53 99.51 0.28 -0.23 -1.31 21.92 0.00 
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TABLE 3. 2 MONTHLY QUOTED BID-ASK SPREAD 
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for the quoted bid-ask spread of twenty-two currency pairs with USD dollar over the period 01/1994 and 12/2016. For 
comparability purposes, the spread is calculated as the difference between ask and bid prices divided by mid prices.   
Statistics AUD CAD NZD ZAR NOK BRL MXN MYR THB EUR CZK CHF DKK TRY GBP JPY SGP CLP SEK PLN KRW HUF 
Mean 1.83 1.12 2.84 8.61 1.88 2.24 3.48 2.08 4.85 0.85 4.04 1.35 1.15 8.60 0.89 1.17 1.63 2.60 2.41 4.44 4.17 5.51 
Median 1.69 0.98 2.60 4.48 1.69 1.82 2.32 1.59 2.92 0.74 3.04 1.29 1.16 4.47 0.77 1.11 1.49 2.00 2.43 3.49 2.39 4.58 
Std. dev. 1.29 0.44 1.49 8.19 1.04 2.94 5.55 2.33 6.52 0.50 3.10 0.63 0.61 14.94 0.45 0.55 0.97 1.83 1.18 3.68 4.92 4.69 
Skewness 7.03 0.71 3.23 1.14 1.04 5.87 8.90 4.04 3.41 0.95 2.55 0.73 0.48 5.24 1.29 0.86 3.33 2.88 0.98 2.98 2.42 1.99 
Kurtosis 79.98 1.17 19.63 0.59 1.71 44.80 108.32 25.31 13.74 1.47 9.22 0.41 0.08 33.96 0.63 1.07 17.7 13.6 2.21 13.27 5.77 5.60 
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3.3.2 Liquidity measure 
 
We apply the quoted bid-ask spread calculated as the difference between ask and bid prices 
divided by mid-price as the liquidity measure while bearing in mind its limitations (Grossman 
and Miller, 1988). In Table 3.2, we report summary statistics for the monthly bid-ask spreads 
of twenty-two currency pairs with the U.S (USD) dollar over the period 01/1994 to 12/2016. 
The table shows that the most liquid currency pairs with USD, as expected, are EUR, GBP and 
CAD while the least liquid currencies are found to be TRY, ZAR and HUF. In the meantime, 
more liquid currencies tend to exhibit smaller volatility, lower skewness and kurtosis of the 
spread and vice versa for relatively less liquid currencies.  
3.3.3 The Global VAR (GVAR) methodology 
 
We employ a GVAR system to build the local currency specific endogenous FX liquidity 
model, as well as, to estimate the interlinkages of FX liquidity among the currencies by 
applying common variables which are supposed to be weakly exogenous. We follow the similar 
application of the model to the global and regional economies in Pesaran, Schuermann and 
Weiner (2004), Cashin et al. (2014), Dees et al. (2007a, b) and Chudik and Pesaran (2016).  
We consider 𝑁 + 1 currencies indexed by 𝑖 = 0, 1, … . , 𝑁. We label USD dollar as 0 and 
indicate it as the reference currency while the other 𝑁 currencies are modelled as endogenous 
liquidity models during the time -periods 𝑡 = 1, 2, … 𝑇. Denoting 𝑥𝑖𝑡 as a 𝑘𝑖 × 1 vector of local 
determinants of FX liquidity treated as endogenous and 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑥
′
1𝑡, 𝑥
′
2𝑡, … . . , 𝑥
′
𝑁𝑡) denote a 
𝑘 ∗ 1 vector of all the variables in the panel where 𝑘 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 . The VARX* model is used to 
build the individual liquidity models. The individual models are designed to estimate domestic 
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variables of the liquidity of a given currency, 𝑥𝑖𝑡, conditional on currency-specific averages of 
foreign variables, collected in the 𝑘∗ × 1 vector  
                                                         𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑊𝑖
′𝑥𝑡                                                                      (3.3) 
for 𝑖 = 0, 1, … . , 𝑁 , where 𝑊𝑖
′ is 𝑘 × 𝑘∗ matrix of country-specific weights, constructed using 
data of bilateral capital flows. The model performs best by treating 𝑘𝑖 and 𝑘
∗ relatively small, 
up to 4 and 6. 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is modelled as a VARX* model representing a VAR model augmented by 
the vector of the “star” variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ , and their lagged values, 
                                          𝑥𝑖𝑡 = ∑ Φ𝑖𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙
𝑝𝑖
𝑙=1 + Λ𝑖0𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + ∑ Λ𝑖𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙
∗𝑞𝑖
𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        (3.4) 
for 𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑁, where 𝚽𝒊𝒍, for 𝑙 = 1, 2, … , 𝑝𝑖, 𝚲𝒊𝒍, for 𝑙 = 0, 1, 2, … 𝑞𝑖 are 𝑘𝑖 × 𝑘𝑖 and 𝑘𝑖 × 𝑘
∗ 
matrices of unknown parameters, respectively, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are 𝑘𝑖 × 1 error vectors. Star variables 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  in liquidity-specific models are treated as weakly exogenous to estimate unknown 
coefficients of the conditional exchange rate specific liquidity models. The assumption of weak 
exogeneity can be tested by Harbo et al. (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2000). It is not a particularly 
strong assumption due to the fact that the impact of individual exchange rates is small relative 
to the rest of the world and the weights used in the construction of the star variables are 
granular. 
Next, we denote 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ , 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ ′) as a  𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘
∗ dimensional vector of domestic and exchange 
rate-specific foreign variables included in the submodel of exchange rate 𝑖 and therefore (3.4) 
can be rewritten as: 
                                                   𝐴𝑖0𝑧𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑙𝑧𝑖𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑙=1                                                     (3.5) 
where 𝐴𝑖0 = (𝐼𝑘𝑖 − Λ𝑖0), 𝐴𝑖𝑙 = (Φ𝑖𝑙, Λ𝑖𝑙) for 𝑙 = 1, 2, … . 𝑝 
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and 𝑝 = max
𝑖
(𝑝𝑖, 𝑞𝑖). We define Φ𝑖𝑙 = 0 for 𝑙 > 𝑝𝑖 and similarly Λ𝑖𝑙 = 0 for 𝑙 > 𝑞𝑖.Individual 
exchange rate models in (3.5) can also be written in the form of an error-correction 
representation as follows: 
                                               ∆𝑥𝑖𝑡 = Λ𝑖0Δ𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ − ∏ 𝑧𝑖.𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝐻𝑖𝑙Δ𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (3.6) 
where ∆= 1 − 𝐿 is the usual first difference operator and  
                    ∏ = 𝐴𝑖0 − ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1  and 𝐻𝑖𝑙 = −(𝐴𝑖,𝑙+1 + 𝐴𝑖,𝑙+2 + ⋯ . +𝐴𝑖,𝑙+𝑝) 
The second step of the GVAR approach consists of stacking estimated exchange rate models 
to form one large global VAR model. Using the (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘
∗) × 𝑘 dimensional “link” matrices 
𝑊𝑖 = (𝐸
′
𝑖, 𝑊𝑖)̃, where 𝐸𝑖 is a 𝑘 × 𝑘𝑖 dimensional selection matrix that select 𝑥𝑖𝑡, and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 =
𝐸𝑖
′𝑥𝑡 and 𝑊′𝑖̂  is the weight matrix introduced in (3.3) to define exchange rate specific foreign 
star variables, then we have: 
                                                        𝑧𝑖𝑡 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ , 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ )′ = 𝑊𝑖𝑥𝑖                                                          (3.7) 
Using (3.7) in (3.5), we get 
𝐴𝑖0𝑊𝑖𝑥𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑙𝑊𝑖𝑥𝑡−𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
And stacking these models for 𝑖 = 1, 2, … … 𝑁, we obtain 
                                               𝐺0𝑥𝑡 = ∑ 𝐺𝑙𝑥𝑡−𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                            (3.8) 
Where 𝜀𝑡 = (𝜀
′
1𝑡, 𝜀
′
2𝑡 , … . . 𝜀𝑁𝑡
′ )′ and 
                                               𝐺𝑙 = (
𝐴1,𝑙 𝑊1
𝐴2,𝑙 𝑊2
𝐴𝑁,𝑙 𝑊𝑁
)                                                                                      (3.9) 
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If the matrix  𝐺0 is invertible, then by multiplying (3.9) by 𝐺0
−1 from the left we obtain the 
solution to the GVAR model 
                                                 𝑥𝑡 = ∑ 𝐹𝑙𝑥𝑡−𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1 + 𝐺0
−1𝜀𝑡                                                       (3.10) 
Where 𝐹𝑙 = 𝐺0
−1𝐺𝑙 for 𝑙 = 1, 2, … . . 𝑝.  
Afterwards, we introduce a dominant exchange rate model by following a similar approach of 
dominant country model in Chudik and Pesaran (2013b). The conditional exchange rate models 
need to be augmented by 𝜔𝑡 and its lagged values, in addition to the exchange rate specific 
vector of cross-section averages of the foreign variables, namely 
                𝑥𝑖𝑡 = ∑ Φ𝑖𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙
𝑝𝑖
𝑙=1 + Λ𝑖0𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + ∑ Λ𝑖𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙
∗𝑞𝑖
𝑙=1 + 𝐷𝑖0𝜔𝑡 + ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑙𝜔𝑡−𝑙
𝑠𝑖
𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (3.11) 
for 𝑖 = 1, 2, … . 𝑁. Both common variables and cross-section averages are treated as weakly 
exogenous to estimate the model.  
Finally, we conduct an impulse-response analysis which is similar to the one in small-scale 
VARs but complicated due to the dimensionality of the GVAR model. We suppose 𝑘  distinct 
structural (orthogonal) shocks. Identification of structural shocks, defined by 𝑣𝑡 = 𝑃
−1𝜀𝑡 
requires finding the 𝑘 × 𝑘 matrix of contemporaneous dependence, 𝑃, such that  
                                                            ∑ = 𝐸(𝜀𝑡𝜀
′
𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃′                                                   (3.12) 
Therefore, by construction we have 𝐸(𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑡
′) = 𝐼𝑘 and the 𝑘 × 1 vector of structural impulse 
response function is given by  
                         𝑔𝑣𝑗(ℎ) = 𝐸(𝑥𝑡+ℎ|𝑣𝑗𝑡 = 1, 𝒥𝑡−1) − 𝐸(𝑥𝑡+ℎ|𝒥𝑡−1) =
𝑅ℎ𝐺0
−1𝑃𝑒𝑗
√𝑒𝑗
′ ∑ 𝑒𝑗
                       (3.13) 
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For 𝑗 = 1, 2, … . 𝑘, where 𝒥𝑡 = {𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡−1, … . } is the information set consisting of all available 
information at time 𝑡, and 𝑒𝑗 is a 𝑘 × 1 selection vector that selects the variable 𝑗 and the 𝑘 × 𝑘 
matrices, The 𝑅ℎ are obtained recursively as: 
𝑅ℎ = ∑ 𝐹𝑙𝑅ℎ−𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1  with 𝑅0 = 𝐼𝑘 and 𝑅𝑙 = 0 for 𝑙 < 0 
Previous GVAR studies (Pesaran et al., 2004; Pesaran and Smith, 2006; Dees et al., 2007a) 
tend to adopt the generalized impulse response function (GIRF) approach as it does not aim at 
identification of shocks according to some canonical system or a priori economic theory but 
considers a counterfactual exercise where the historical correlations of shocks are assumed as 
given. In the context of GVAR model (3.10) the 𝑘 × 1 vector of GIRFs is given by  
                    𝑔𝜀𝑗(ℎ) = 𝐸(𝑥𝑡+ℎ|𝜀𝑗𝑡 = √𝜎𝑗𝑗 , 𝒥𝑡−1) − 𝐸(𝑥𝑡+ℎ|𝒥𝑡−1) =
𝑅ℎ𝐺0
−1∑𝑒𝑗
√𝑒𝑗′∑𝑒𝑗
                       (3.14) 
For 𝑗 = 1, 2, … . , 𝑘 ,   ℎ = 0, 1, 2, … . ., where √𝜎𝑗𝑗 = √𝐸(𝜀𝑗𝑡
2 ) is the size of shock which is set 
to one standard deviation (s.d) of 𝜀𝑗𝑡. 
3.3.4 Supply side modelling 
 
Following the FX liquidity literature, we attempt to investigate the transmission of commodity 
prices to FX liquidity from the cross-sectional demand and supply-side sources, as well as, a 
commonality factor.  
The supply-side represents to what extent financial intermediaries are inclined to provide 
liquidity in favourable (or adverse) times of funding. Based on the structure of GVAR model, 
we use two common variables:  1) the TED spread (i.e the difference between the interest rates 
on interbank loans and short term U.S government debt) to capture general funding conditions 
and 2) FX volatility (i.e changes in the JP Morgan Global FX volatility index which tracks the 
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implied volatility of three-month at-the-money forward options on major and developed 
currencies) to control the general market condition.  
From the domestic side, we endogenously model the cross section of liquidity of 23 exchange   
rates by using individual bid-ask spreads, local money market interest rates, and country 
specific CTOT. In Table 3.3, we present a detailed description of all the relevant data sources.  
3.3.5 Demand side modelling 
 
The demand side represents the determinants that increase the market demand for a specific 
currency. Following Karnaukh, Ronaldo and Soderlind (2015), we adopt trade and capital 
flows as the main determinants of the demand side of FX liquidity. To test the effect of CTOT, 
we jointly model the cross section of bid-ask spreads and capital flows (i.e measured as total 
export to the U.S scaled by the GDP of the quoted currency) in the endogenous system.  Since 
more financially developed countries can benefit from better funding conditions and higher 
leverage (see Maggiori, 2012) and currencies of larger economies can better hedge against 
global shocks (see Hassan, 2013), we use two common variables in the demand side model: 1) 
VIX as a global volatility index 2) FX volatility as a proxy for the market condition. Again, in 
Table 3.3, we present a detailed description of all the relevant data sources.   
3.3.6 Commodity price as a commonality  
 
In the demand and supply sides equations, we estimate the impulse responses of the spreads to 
the exchange rate specific CTOT shocks.  
Additionally, by taking the advantage of the GVAR model, we also explore commodity prices 
as a commonality factor of FX liquidity. The model allows us to explicitly define a common 
variable in the model setup rather than finding covariances between an exchange rate and the 
average market which is commonly used in the FX liquidity literature. In this manner, we can 
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estimate the impulse responses of individual bid-ask spreads to the shocks to global commodity 
price index. 
In this setup, we jointly model the cross-sectional bid-ask spreads together with supply and 
demand determinants (i.e local money market rates and capital flows) in the endogenous 
system, while using commodity prices index of IMF and FX market volatility indicators as 
common variables. In Table 3.3, we show the detailed description of the data sources.  
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TABLE 3. 3 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SOURCES 
Variable Description Source 
TED spread 
The difference between the interest rates in interbank loans and on short term U.S government 
debt 
Bloomberg 
FX volatility 
JP Morgan Global FX volatility index which tracks implied volatility of three-month at-the-
money forward options on major and developed currencies 
Bloomberg 
Local money market 
rates 
Short-term money market interest rates DataStream 
VIX 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility (VIX) Index which measures implied 
volatility of S&P 500 index options 
Bloomberg 
Export of BC to QC Export from the BC country to the QC country, scaled by the BC GDP DataStream 
Commodity price index IMF commodity price index calculated based on the prices of all commodities IFS 
Bid-ask spread The difference bid-ask prices divided by mid prices DataStream 
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3.4 Empirical Results 
As explained in the previous section, we estimate the impulse responses of the cross-section 
currency illiquidity to exchange-rate specific CTOT shocks, as well as, including a commodity 
price index shock as a commonality factor. Specifically, we obtain the generalized impulse 
response functions as given in equation (3.14). We separately estimate the CTOT shocks in the 
cross-sectional supply and demand side of FX liquidity by following previous studies 
(Karnaukh, Ronaldo and Soderlind, 2015; Banti and Phylaktis, 2015). Afterwards, we estimate 
the transmission of commodity price shocks as a commonality factor to the cross-sectional 
illiquidity while simultaneously controlling the main cross-sectional demand and supply 
determinants as domestic and foreign variables.  
First then, we estimate the impulse responses of the cross-sectional illiquidity to the exchange 
specific CTOT shocks in supply side context. Although, the commodity price as a factor seems 
more appropriate to the demand side model, the exchange rates, especially those which have a 
small and commodity-export based economy can be expected to be affected by CTOT shocks 
via the local and global funding rates channels. CTOT shocks can influence the investment 
decisions and sentiments of local financial intermediaries, can be ultimately reflected in the 
illiquidity of local currency.  
Figure 3.1 reports the median (solid line) impulse responses of illiquidity of the currencies to 
one-unit standard deviation shock for country specific CTOT in the supply side framework 
over 3 years (36 months). The estimation period covers from 01/1994 to 12/2016. The dotted 
lines are bootstrap 95% confidence bands obtained with 1000 bootstrap replication. 
 The graphs show that illiquidity of the currencies belonging to relatively developed economies 
(such as GBP, JPY, CHF, SGD, KRW), excluding SEK is not significantly influenced by local 
CTOT shocks.  
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FIGURE 3. 1 GIRFS OF THE CROSS-SECTIONAL ILLIQUIDITY TO ONE STANDARD DEVIATION SHOCK TO COUNTRY SPECIFIC CTOT SHOCKS WITHIN THE SUPPLY SIDE 
FRAMEWORK. THE ESTIMATION PERIOD COVERS 01/1994 TO 12/2016. THE SOLID LINE INDICATES THE MEDIAN IMPULSE RESPONSE WHILE THE DOTTED LINES ARE 
BOOTSTRAP 95% CONFIDENCE BANDS OBTAINED WITH 1000 BOOTSTRAP REPLICATIONS. THE MAGNITUDES OF THE RESPONSES ARE SCALED UP BY THE SAME AMOUNT. 
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It is not hard to explain this finding as the variation in illiquidity of the currencies of developed 
economies can be significantly explained by local money market rates within the supply side 
model.  
Additionally, combining global FX volatility and TED spread which are known as highly 
significant commonality factors for the most popular currencies in the supply model, leave a 
very small room for CTOT shocks to explain the variation in the cross-sectional illiquidity. Of 
course, it should be noted that currency illiquidity of developed economies but are more 
exposed to commodity exporting (such as AUD, NOK, NZD, CAD) does respond the local 
CTOT shocks significantly during first few lags but dies away afterwards. In these cases, the 
local CTOT shocks may stimulate the sentiments of market participants in these countries due 
to their dependence on commodity exporting. However, portfolio rebalancing, international 
investments can reasonably stabilize the short-term plunges in illiquidity.  
Conversely, the currency illiquidity of less developed countries (commodity currencies or 
others) significantly respond to the local CTOT shocks over a prolonged period. Following the 
CTOT shocks, the illiquidity of the currencies such as BRL, CLP, CZK, HUF and PLN tend to 
experience a persistent, long-lived fall. Three currencies, MYR, THB, TRY, can be considered 
exceptions because they are less developed currencies, but illiquidity is not influenced by the 
CTOT shocks.  
Subsequently, we estimate the impulse responses of cross-sectional illiquidity to the exchange 
specific CTOT shocks in the cross- sectional demand side framework. We replace local money 
market rates with capital flows (i.e export to U.S) as a domestic variable. Thus, we jointly 
model bid-ask spreads, capital flows with U.S and CTOT in the endogenous system. Similarly, 
we add the VIX index, known as a common determinant in FX liquidity, as a proxy for market 
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sentiment, instead of the TED spread as a global variable. We also keep FX volatility as a 
global variable for proxying general market conditions.  
Figure 3.2 reports the median (solid line) impulse responses of illiquidity of the currencies to 
one-unit standard deviation for the country specific CTOT shocks in the demand side 
framework over 3 years (36 months). The estimation period covers 01/1994 to 12/2016. The 
dotted lines are bootstrap 95% confidence bands obtained with 1000 bootstrap replication. 
As expected, illiquidity of most of the currencies significantly responds to local CTOT shocks. 
A one-unit standard deviation shock is followed by a persistent effect on illiquidity in most of 
currencies, excluding highly liquid currencies such as CHF, JPY and GBP and Asian currencies 
such as THB, KRW, MYR and SGD. 
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FIGURE 3. 2 GIRFS OF THE CROSS SECTION OF ILLIQUIDITY TO THE COUNTRY SPECIFIC CTOT SHOCKS WITHIN THE DEMAND SIDE FRAMEWORK. THE ESTIMATION 
PERIOD COVERS 01/1994 TO 12/2016. THE SOLID LINE INDICATES THE MEDIAN IMPULSE RESPONSE WHILE THE DOTTED LINES ARE BOOTSTRAP 95% CONFIDENCE BANDS 
OBTAINED WITH 1000 BOOTSTRAP REPLICATIONS. THE MAGNITUDES OF THE RESPONSES ARE SCALED UP BY THE SAME AMOUNT.    
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Our demand side approach explores the determinants that increase the market demand for a 
specific currency. CTOT shocks stimulate the market demand for the local currency and pushes 
up liquidity for most of our currencies. Not surprisingly, jointly modelling capital flows while 
controlling for market sentiment (VIX) and general market condition increases the effects of 
CTOT shocks. The reason for not observing a significant effect on highly liquid currencies 
might be that illiquidity of these currencies is influenced by a lot of other factors. Therefore, 
the effect of CTOT shocks on monthly basis might not be observable.  
Finally, we explicitly explore commodity price as a commonality factor in the cross-sectional 
variation of illiquidity of the currencies. The GVAR model allows us to explicitly define 
commonality factor in the global variables section. The common factor pass-through to the 
cross-sectional variable of interest via trade flow and interlinkages of cross sections. Since 
CTOT is a country specific data, we use the commodity price index from the IMF as a global 
variable. In the endogenous system, we simultaneously model cross-sectional demand (capital 
flows), supply (local money market rates) side factors and bid-ask spread.  
Figure 3.3 reports the median (solid line) impulse responses of illiquidity of the currencies to 
a one-unit standard deviation shock for commodity price index over 3 years 6 months). The 
estimation period covers from 01/1994 to 12/2016. The dotted lines are bootstrap 95% 
confidence bands obtained with 1000 bootstrap replications.  
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FIGURE 3. 3 GIRFS OF THE CROSS SECTION OF ILLIQUIDITY TO THE COMMON COMMODITY PRICE SHOCKS. THE ESTIMATION PERIOD COVERS 01/1994 TO 12/2016. THE 
SOLID LINE INDICATES THE MEDIAN IMPULSE RESPONSE WHILE THE DOTTED LINES ARE BOOTSTRAP 95% CONFIDENCE BANDS OBTAINED WITH 1000 BOOTSTRAP 
REPLICATIONS. THE MAGNITUDES OF THE RESPONSES ARE SCALED UP BY THE SAME AMOUNT. 
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The graphs show that illiquidity of the currencies considerably exposed to commodity 
exporting, also known as “commodity currencies” (AUD, CAD, BRL, ZAR, NOK, NZD, 
MXN) are significantly influenced by the common commodity price shocks. The currencies of 
small economies (CLP, SEK, PLN, HUF, CZP, DKK) are also significantly influenced by 
commodity price shock. As in the demand side model, highly liquid currencies are not 
significantly affected by common commodity price shock which might be explained by similar 
reasons.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the transmission of commodity prices to the illiquidity of 22 currency 
pairs with the USD. The empirical findings in the extant literature on the linkages between 
commodity prices and exchange rates, the role of liquidity in factor investing and the 
shortcomings of methodologies used in the FX literature motivated us to investigate 
commodity price pass-through to FX liquidity. In particular, we construct a new monthly 
dataset of country specific CTOT with updated trade weights and apply this in a GVAR 
framework.  
This study can be useful for other researchers in the international finance area who wish to use 
higher frequency country-specific commodity terms-of-trade data. Our novelty lies in the 
dataset, considering commodity price as an additional determinant of FX liquidity, and the use 
of the GVAR approach. Moreover, we contribute to the FX liquidity literature with the 
following findings.  
Illiquidity of the currencies of less developed economies experience a persistent fall, following 
local CTOT shock in the supply side framework. In the meantime, local CTOT shocks leave a 
significant but temporary effect on illiquidity of the currencies of developed economies but 
relatively more exposed to commodity exporting. Illiquidity of most currencies significantly 
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responds to local CTOT shocks in the demand side framework. A one-unit standard deviation 
shock is followed by a persistent effect on illiquidity in most of currencies, excluding highly 
liquid currencies. Illiquidity of the currencies that are considerably exposed to commodity 
exporting is significantly influenced by common commodity price shocks. The currencies of 
small economies are also significantly influenced by commodity price shocks. We do not a find 
a similar effect for highly liquid currencies which might be explained by a high explanatory 
power of local money market rates and global funding conditions, as well as, the influence of 
short-term trading strategies.  
This study suggests to the international finance literature that it is important not to limit with 
commodity currencies to explore the links between commodity price and exchange rates. Given 
the significant variation in the sensitivity of the exchange rates to the commodity price changes, 
the selection of an appropriate commodity price indicator might be a decisive factor to have 
comprehensive empirical findings. Apart from the international finance literature, this study 
can be useful to investors who wish to exploit the illiquidity premium in factor investing. The 
findings suggest investors that commodity prices can be an additional tool to model the 
direction of the liquidity of floating exchange rates. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Liquidity is characterized by transaction cost, time and price impact dimensions to execute 
market operations. Due to its importance in financial markets, market liquidity has received 
considerable attention by researchers in recent years. At the stock market level, although the 
time series and cross-sectional determinants are extensively investigated, forecasting stock 
market liquidity has not been attempted so far. Monetary aggregates are known to have been 
influenced by monetary policy and economic activity, but never explored in different political 
regimes. While FX liquidity can be considered as a relatively new area in market liquidity, a 
number of studies have explored its cross-sectional and time series determinants after recent 
financial crisis. Although a strong link between commodity prices and exchange rates has been 
documented in the literature, none of the studies attempts to study commodity prices as a 
potential cross-sectional determinant and commonality factor of FX liquidity.  
This thesis studies three aspects of market liquidity, namely, forecasting stock market liquidity, 
exploring the US monetary aggregates under different political regimes and the transmission 
of commodity price to FX liquidity.  
The first chapter explores the power of investor sentiment to forecast stock market liquidity. 
Motivated by the theoretical links between market liquidity and investor sentiment, the chapter 
aims to investigate whether investor sentiment has the ability to forecast stock market liquidity. 
By carrying out 1-4 steps at the weekly and 1-2 steps at the monthly out-of-sample forecasting 
works, the study finds that investor sentiment is a statistically significant indicator to forecast 
NYSE liquidity at the weekly and monthly frequences. The forecasting performance is found 
to be better at the weekly than monthly estimations. Moreover, investor sentiment spread is 
shown to exhibit a better performance than the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index. The 
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study contributes to the scarce liquidity forecasting literature, and also provides empirical 
insight to the microstructure of the stock market literature.  
The second chapter explores the partisan gap in U.S. monetary aggregates. Based on strong 
theoretical and empirical links between monetary aggregates and economic activity, as well as 
stock market returns, the chapter aims to investigate whether the presidential gap might be 
present in the monetary aggregates. The study documents that there is a positive Democratic 
gap in U.S. monetary aggregates. The gap found is as much as 5 percent and 9 percent per 
annum in the M1 and M2 growth rates, respectively. The study finds a partisan Fed chair is a 
statistically significant indicator to explain the presidential gap. In other words, the Democratic 
Fed chair gap is found to be statistically more robust than the Democratic presidential gap in 
the growth rates of the monetary aggregates. The chapter contributes to the money supply 
literature by exploring it under political regimes to enrich the U.S. presidential puzzle literature. 
The third chapter explores the transmission of commodity prices to the illiquidity of 22 
currency pairs relative to the U.S. dollar. The chapter investigates commodity price pass-
through to FX liquidity by exploiting a new monthly dataset of country specific CTOT with 
updated trade weights in a GVAR framework. The chapter finds that illiquidity of the 
currencies of less developed economies and commodity currencies experience a persistent fall, 
following a local CTOT shock in the supply side framework. The chapter also documents that 
illiquidity of most currencies, excluding highly liquid ones significantly responds to local 
CTOT shocks in the demand side framework. Finally, illiquidity of the commodity currencies 
and the currencies of small economies are significantly influenced by commodity price shocks. 
The chapter suggests to the international finance literature that commodity price shocks 
significantly influence the illiquidity of the FX market not only for the commodity currencies 
but for most floating exchange rates. Given the significant variation in the sensitivity of the 
130 
 
exchange rates to the commodity price changes, the selection of an appropriate commodity 
price indicator might be an important factor in improving estimation.  
As in all research, these thesis chapters have several limitations. In the first chapter, the original 
liquidity metrics have to be filtered to match the data series with the econometric requirements 
of the forecasting model. One might consider it forecasting a filtered series rather than liquidity 
metrics. In the second chapter, I empirically demonstrate that the democratic FED chair gap 
can statistically explain the democratic presidential gap. However, the political aspects of 
whether Fed chair cycles are truly independent from presidential cycles have not been explored, 
as it is beyond the scope of the chapter. In the third chapter, I document that commodity prices 
shocks matter for the illiquidity of most floating exchange rates. However, only the transaction 
cost aspect of market liquidity is employed due to the data limitations. Perhaps, using a price-
impact measure may produce different results, as bid-ask spread is not always a reliable 
measure.  
The findings of this thesis can be further studied in several ways. First, forecasting stock market 
liquidity with or without investor sentiment can be carried out in a more sophisticated 
modelling framework. Second, the political and institutional aspects of the relationship 
between U.S president and Fed chair and the implications for the monetary aggregates can be 
further explored. Empirically, bootstrap tests can be applied to overcome small sample 
problem. Finally, the third chapter can be further extended to explore the reasons why 
commodity price shocks matter for the illiquidity of some currencies but not others. Moreover, 
it might be a good idea to revisit the “commodity currency” concept, as we find that commodity 
terms of trade shocks leave more persistent effects on the illiquidity of the currencies of less 
developed economies rather than on commodity currencies.   
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